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NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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Governmental Affairs

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, April 2, 1976

Intelligence Oversight Compromise Offered

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

The powerful Democratic whip, Sen. Robert C. Byrd (W.Va.), declared yesterday that there is "no way" the resolution to establish a new Senate committee on intelligence activities could pass "as now written."

Saying the "political climate indicates a necessity for some kind of committee," Byrd offered a compromise plan to solve a jurisdiction fight that has entangled the present proposal.

Under the Byrd plan, a new, permanent Senate intelligence oversight committee would be set up with subpoena power but without budgetary control over intelligence agencies.

Byrd's suggestion came during Senate Rules Committee questioning of Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the Senate intelligence committee and an architect of the proposal un-

der attack.

Under the resolution approved March 2 by the Senate Government Operations Committee, the new intelligence committee would have taken jurisdiction over intelligence agencies' budgets from three powerful Senate committees—Armed Services, Judiciary and Foreign Relations.

All three committees have raised objections to the proposal.

Byrd told Church: "That road is so formidable, and difficult to travel." Instead he suggested that, "we may achieve the desired objective" by giving subpoena power to the new committee and "leaving the rest where it lies."

Otherwise, Byrd said, approval might be endangered because "the resolution will be subjected to unlimited debate."

In his initial statement, Church said overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction be-

tween the new committee and the old ones was the "traditional" Senate solution "where the interest of two committees... is strong."

After Byrd offered his compromise, Church argued "the power of the purse is the ultimate authority" and he "couldn't see effective oversight without" it.

A letter from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, introduced at the hearing yesterday, supported the position that it is impossible to separate cleanly the Defense Department's intelligence budget from its overall spending since many programs are intermixed.

Rumsfeld echoed the Byrd suggestion that the new committee undertake only intelligence oversight.

Other senators raised with Church the proposal that the new committee be authorized to disclose classified information over a President's objection.

Church responded, saying "the greatest breach of secu-

rity" he had ever seen was the recent disclosure by the CIA that the Israeli government possesses 10 or more nuclear weapons. "I have never even heard anyone was reprimanded," Church said.

To emphasize his point that the resolution as now written was vulnerable to attack, Byrd spent 20 minutes listing more than a dozen Senate rules that would have to be revised in major or minor ways to conform to the resolution's language.

Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.), chairman of the Government Operations Committee that drafted the resolution, told Byrd "not a single point there can't be reconciled" by redrafting the resolution.

Ribicoff proposed a staff meeting to iron out differences but Rules Committee Chairman Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.) said that was "premature" since "we don't know ourselves" what is needed.

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, APRIL 2, 1976

C.I.A. Said to Have Known In '50's of Lockheed Bribes

Data on Japanese Reportedly Were Not
Passed on to State Dept. or Grumman,
Whose Fighter Lost Out to F-104

By ANN CRITTENDEN

Many of the details of the bribery of Japanese politicians by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in the late 1950's, in connection with the sale of the F-104 fighter plane to Japan, were reported at that time to the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, according to a former C.I.A. official and Japanese sources.

Although the C.I.A. was aware of the bribery, public disclosure of the payoffs did not come until last Feb. 4 in hearings of the Senate subcommittee on multinational corporations.

The scandal has created international tensions and touched off worldwide investi-

gations of the payments by Lockheed and other American companies to various parties in Europe, Japan and the Middle East to win lucrative multimillion-dollar sales contracts for various products ranging from aircraft to pharmaceuticals.

The Lockheed payoffs in Japan, involving \$12.6 million over a period of 20 years, were made to top officials of the Government, primarily through Yoshio Kodama, an influential power broker in Japan who has already been identified as the most important behind-the-scenes representative of Lockheed at that time.

Mr. Kodama has not been identified as a C.I.A. agent, but

he has had a long-standing relationship with American Embassy officials in Japan. In addition, Mr. Kodama was the recipient of American funds for covert projects on several occasions, according to former C.I.A. officials.

The C.I.A. headquarters in Washington was informed of the Lockheed payoffs through C.I.A. channels from the embassy in Tokyo in the late 1950's. A Japanese citizen who worked for Lockheed in 1958, when certain bribes were known to have been made, has said he told an American Embassy officer of these payoffs.

He has denied having taken part in the payments himself and has said that he was unaware that the officer was a C.I.A. agent.

Former senior intelligence officials have confirmed that the Embassy official was indeed a C.I.A. staff officer assigned to the Tokyo station.

One former official who was in a position to see the reports said that the C.I.A. station in Tokyo "was checking with headquarters every step of the way when the Lockheed thing came up."

"Every move made was approved by Washington," he added, asserting that details of

the Lockheed affair were known in high levels within the agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency failed to pass this information on to the State Department or to the Grumman Aircraft Corporation, whose F11F-1F Super Tiger jet fighter was first selected for purchase by the Japanese Government in 1958 and then in 1959 rejected in favor of the Lockheed plane.

Lockheed is estimated to have spent some \$1.5 million to win the Japanese jet fighter contract away from Grumman in the late 1950's. In all, Lockheed paid fees, commissions and bribes totaling \$12.6 million to sell \$700 million worth of aircraft to Japan between 1956 and 1975.

Kodama Earned \$750,000

Of that total, some \$7 million went to Mr. Kodama, who earned an estimated \$750,000.

If the information concerning the Lockheed bribes was passed on to the Justice Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Internal Revenue Service, no action was taken to investigate the irregularities.

Foreign bribes are not in themselves illegal under Federal law. However, the bribes are not tax-deductible and the large foreign payoffs raise the possibility that Lockheed and other companies might have il-

NEW YORK TIMES
1 April 1976

HOUSE PANEL SAYS SCHORR CASE LAGS

Leader of Inquiry Says Trial
Showing How Press Got
C.I.A. Report Is 'Cold'

By RICHARD D. LYONS
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 31—The Federal and Congressional investigations into the unauthorized disclosures to the press of the report of the report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, are bogging down, and persons active in the investigation are expressing doubts that they will be completed, much less support legal actions against anyone.

Representative John J. Flynt, the Georgia Democrat who is in charge of the House investigation, said after a meeting today of his Committee on Standards of Official Conduct that "the trail is getting cold."

Mr. Flynt said that his committee's staff was having problems drawing up a list of questions to be posed to people who might know how substantial portions of the report about Central Intelligence Agency operations reached the Village Voice and other publications. Representative Otis G. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk, headed the House select committee that made the report.

"If we had had subpoena power a month ago we could have wrapped up the case by now," Mr. Flynt said, adding that the memories of some persons familiar with the case were being "dimmed" by time.

Senior Justice Department officials are increasingly pessimistic that grounds for criminal

prosecution will be found in the case because most, if not all, of the so-called classified material involved seems to have been made public in one form or another before it appeared in The Village Voice last month.

For the last six weeks lawyers in the criminal division of the Justice Department have sought to determine if material originally classified as secret that was contained in the Pike report had in fact been in the public domain.

One Federal attorney involved in the departmental inquiry said it was apparent from the start that "99 percent" of the material in the report of the Pike committee already had been in the public domain.

The case boils down to the remaining 1 percent, he said, adding that it is thought that even this material was previously divulged.

If the justice department investigation collapses, as it seems to be on the verge of doing, it would be almost impossible to bring charges that the Espionage Act had been violated by either Daniel Schorr or any other newsman who had reported details of the contents of the Pike report. Mr. Schorr is the CBS News correspondent here who has admitted providing a copy of the report to The Voice.

On Jan. 20, The New York Times published articles giving the substance of the documents, which severely criticized the C.I.A. and other Federal intelligence gathering organizations. In the days that followed, The Times and other news organizations published additional arti-

cles concerning the report.

On Jan. 29, the House voted not to make the report public. Two weeks later, The Village Voice started publishing substantial excerpts from it. The disclosures angered many congressmen, and, on Feb. 19, the House voted to have Mr. Flynt's committee undertake an inquiry. But for the past six weeks there has been disagreement within the House, first over increased subpoena powers for the committee, then for investigative funds. Both were eventually approved.

"Information we could have gotten under oath five weeks ago will be more difficult to obtain now," Mr. Flynt said today. His committee met in closed session for half an hour today, then adjourned without setting a future meeting date and without having settled details of how the inquiry should proceed.

The committee still has not formally hired a staff to conduct the investigation. Investigators, mainly former agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and attorneys have been selected but their contracts with the committee have not been approved by the House Administration Committee and may not be for several days. About a dozen contracts have been submitted.

Additionally, friction has developed within the special staff over who among them is in charge of the inquiry. David Bowers, a former F.B.I. inspector, appears to have won a jurisdictional dispute with C. B. Rogers, an Atlanta lawyer who had been picked to be the special chief counsel.

BALTIMORE SUN
15 March 1976

23 Russians listed as spies in the U.S.

Lantana, Fla. (AP)—The names of 23 Soviet espionage agents said to be operating openly in the United States have been learned by the *National Enquirer*, the weekly newspaper said yesterday.

One of the espionage agents is Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, the publication said.

In New York, a spokesman at the Soviet Union's United Nations mission said there would be no comment on the report.

Those named by the weekly newspaper were described as diplomats. Several of them are based in Washington and pay frequent visits to officials in the White House, the Pentagon, Congress and various federal agencies, the *National Enquirer* said.

It described Mr. Malik as the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence agent in the United States. The paper said four Soviet citizens serving on the United Nations administrative staff are intelligence agents.

The *National Enquirer* reported that the information for its story came from American intelligence sources, including James Angleton, former chief of counter-intelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency, and David Phillips, a former CIA official who is now the president of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers.

In Washington, Mr. Phillips denied that he had given the newspaper any information.

"I was contacted by someone from the *Enquirer* about the story, asking assistance from my Association of Retired Intelligence Officers in identifying Soviet intelligence officers in this country," he said.

"I refused. The rationale for this is that our association believes the identification of intelligence officers leads not to retaliation from other intelligence services but from the crazies of the world, and consequently the statement that I identified these gentlemen is incorrect."

legally reduced their taxable corporate income by deducting the bribe payments as business expenses.

It is also possible that false statements, punishable by Federal law, were made to such Government agencies as the Department of Defense, which monitors foreign arms sales.

One Justice Department official told of the allegations of C.I.A. awareness of early Lockheed payoffs, said that although it might not have been legally incumbent upon the agency to report what it knew to the Justice Department, the agency's apparent failure to do so was "certainly a matter of concern from a policy point of view."

Part in Payoffs Denied

When informed of the allegation, Mitchell Rogovin, the special counsel to the Director of Central Intelligence George Bush, said that "the only thing we can say is we have no records of any agency involvement with Lockheed or the bribes." He denied that the agency as an institution had participated in the payoffs.

Mr. Rogovin said that he could say nothing either confirming or denying any agency knowledge of the payments to Japanese officials, or any involvement in them by C.I.A. agents.

A spokesman for Lockheed denied that the company had had any dealings with individuals in Japan that it knew to be C.I.A. agents.

According to knowledgeable sources, Mr. Kodama, a powerful ultrarightist who for years exerted a significant behind-the-scenes influence on politicians of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, also had a long-standing relationship with American Embassy officials in Japan.

In the early 1950's, he is said to have received some \$150,000 from the American Embassy to smuggle a hoard of tungsten out of mainland China on Nationalist warships and deliver it to United States authorities in Tokyo.

According to a former C.I.A. official and to Robert H. Booth, an American said to have acted as Mr. Kodama's agent in the arrangement, the Americans never received the tungsten. Mr. Kodama let it be known that the ship had sunk, and apparently kept the commission.

One former agent noted that there were some sentiment at C.I.A. headquarters in Washington that Mr. Kodama, who also had close ties to the Tokyo underworld, was untrustworthy and was using the Americans and their financing for his own ends.

In this man's opinion, American authorities were spending vast amounts of money subsidizing extreme rightists to fight a Communism never really a serious threat in Japan.

Other experts disagree, arguing that, particularly in the late 1940's, there was a real possibility of a left-wing regime in Japan.

According to Ivan Morris,

professor of Japanese at Columbia University and an authority on the extreme right-wing in postwar Japan, the "enormous" American financial support for conservative elements in the country was crucial in 1947 and 1948.

In those years, Japanese politics could have turned in a different direction, Professor Morris maintained. "A lot was done to prevent that," he said, "and successfully."

Among other things, American occupation authorities in the late 1940's and the 1950's used extreme right-wing former military officers to provide information on and to disrupt left-wing groups.

In November 1951, for example, one of these officers, Col. Takushiro Hattori, a former secretary of General Tojo, allegedly provided American authorities with information on leftist novelist Kaji Wataru, who was subsequently kidnapped by Occupation forces and held incommunicado by C.I.A. agents for a year, according to sources inside and outside of the Government.

Wednesday, March 24, 1976

The Washington Star

IN FOCUS *The Devious Art of Making Intelligence Fit the Policy*

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

One source calls it "keyhole questioning."

The way a number of present and former government officials describe it, questions are framed by the administration so narrowly as to elicit responses from the U.S. intelligence community that will support predetermined policies.

There are other techniques for the selective use of intelligence, too. Sometimes a branch of the administration rejects intelligence findings, insisting that some factors have been ignored, until finally a useful finding is made.

What several officials call "playing the intelligence game" is an old bureaucratic art.

They say it was brought to a new peak of refinement and a new frequency of use when Dr. Henry A. Kissinger was the presidential adviser on national security, and it continues with Kissinger as secretary of state in charge of arms control negotiations with Moscow. Other parts of the bureaucracy also play the game.

A senior administration official involved in the reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community under President Ford's Feb. 18 executive order says the changes now being made will not prevent such abuses of intelligence.

MATERIAL STILL can be ordered from the CIA, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and other parts of the community in ways that will fit it into top policymakers' preconceptions.

One senior official involved in major policy decisions, who describes himself as "an avid consumer of intelligence," says he is unaware of leading questions being submitted to the intelligence community. "These charges fit into the category of insinuations that make the rounds," he comments.

Several other officials and congressional sources point in the direction of that senior official's operations, if not at him personally, as one of the major areas of the selective intelligence use that he denies.

General policies are framed on the basis of overall intelligence evaluations. Decisions are made on what is generally desirable for the United States, like a cease-fire in Vietnam, a strategic armaments limitations treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union, an interim Sinai settlement in the Middle East, or a new weapons system.

But then new developments, newly received information on old situations, or fresh analyses of problems can sometimes poke holes in policies.

Awkward facts that argue against decisions can appear. If the decision was a controversial one in the first place, as many major policies are, then new facts can reopen and threaten to change it.

The tendency, therefore, sometimes is to try to adapt the intelligence to the policy, rather than the other way around, some officials say.

The "keyhole questioning" method is putting very tightly defined requests for specific answers to the intelligence community — primarily to the CIA — without giving the context in which the answer is going to be used or allowing any surrounding circumstances to be considered. These amount to loaded questions.

IF THE FIRST question draws an answer that does not seem to justify the policy course already decided upon, then another one is framed, "just three degrees to one side, enough to force another study, in hopes of getting a different answer," one official explained.

This can go on for some time, until finally the inquirer hits upon a formula that yields an answer that then can be used in bureaucratic debates to support the policy. Earlier questions and answers are quietly forgotten.

A current case in point involves a Soviet supersonic bomber with the Western code name of Backfire.

When Kissinger arranged the preliminary agreement for a second SALT treaty with the Soviet Union in November 1974, Backfire was not included within the limitations. The Pentagon objected that the plane has the capability at striking the United States from Soviet territory, and therefore had to be counted. Moscow denied that it was an intercontinental bomber, arguing that it was properly excluded from the agreement.

This objection has been a major stumbling block in turning the agreement into the treaty that Kissinger and his top advisers seek for overall policy reasons. They have argued in the National Security Council that Backfire did not deserve to be counted.

Backfire also has been a problem within the Pentagon, since it affects arms programs of the United States.

Eight intelligence studies of the Backfire's range potential have been made. Each one showed that it

could reach the United States.

According to one source who reflects suspicion of Kissinger's approach on SALT II, CIA technical experts confirmed in one study last autumn that Backfire had an intercontinental capability. But then other CIA officials tried to overrule the technicians by saying they had determined that the Soviets had no intention of using Backfire in a long-range role.

THE OTHER officials "buckled under pressure" from Kissinger, this source asserted. But the then-director of CIA, William E. Colby, overruled the finding based on intentions, insisting that his agency had to stick to proveable data rather than supplying policymakers with the interpretations they sought.

A senior State Department official insists, however, that such problems arose more from Pentagon rivalry over countering Backfire than from pressure by Kissinger's SALT negotiating team.

Finally, another source reported, after the eight studies, the CIA was instructed to commission a new study by engineers of the McDonnell-Douglas Corp., a major military aircraft manufacturer. The engineers were given intelligence data on the Backfire's wing shape and other factors that were certain to show greater aeronautical drag than earlier studies had found, hence less range.

But their study only reduced the range by about 200 miles. It still was enough to reach the United States.

The CIA reportedly was also used to help justify the 1972 SALT I agreement.

Its "best estimate" of what Soviet strength in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and other strategic weapons would become without that treaty was only marginally above the treaty limitations. That did not provide a good argument for U.S. Senate approval of the treaty, which was viewed with doubt by some senators.

The CIA suddenly came up with a "force four" estimate, which put the potential Soviet strength without the treaty limitations much higher, thus making the

treaty look more desirable and more worthy of Senate approval.

THE NEW ESTIMATE apparently was a result of a "keyhole question" asking what Moscow might achieve if it launched an all-out strategic weapons building program. Intelligence analysts did not expect an all-out program, but their terms of reference were too limited to permit them to give the perspective that they felt the situation should have had.

Such uses — or, in the views of concerned officials, misuses — of intelligence have extended into several other fields, according to various sources.

One civilian source said that last summer the NSC, then still directed by Kissinger, flatly told the CIA the result that it wanted

from an intelligence study on a non-SALT subject. The well qualified source declined to have the subject identified.

When last year's interim Middle East truce agreement was being arranged, the CIA was asked for a specific judgment on whether there would be a war without such an agreement. Hemmed in, the CIA said yes, thus appearing to support Kissinger's efforts to bring full U.S. governmental pressure to bear on the settlement.

"But, of course, the agency could just as well have answered that there might be a war even with an agreement, if it had been allowed enough latitude to exercise its professional judgment," a former official said.

OTHER OFFICIALS RE-

called that CIA estimates of Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam were juggled to suit Kissinger's efforts to negotiate a Vietnam ceasefire during 1972. "Those estimates never were any good, but they got quoted as if they were important," a former CIA official said.

There has also been intensive pressure on the CIA to do things that it is simply incapable of doing.

The preliminary agreement for SALT II distinguishes between ICBMs with single and with multiple warheads. Kissinger leaned hard on the CIA to find ways of telling which Soviet missiles ready in launching silos had multiple warheads.

The agency could not tell. Reconnaissance satellites could not see inside the missiles. Finally, an exter-

nal trait of dubious validity was seized upon as indicative, in order to try to satisfy the demand and relieve the pressure. Later evidence showed it to be invalid, however.

All of this frustrates the CIA, according to former and current officials of the agency as well as outsiders with contact there. Officially, the CIA will not discuss the subject.

"We can't do a proper job if we don't know the context in which a question has to be considered," one official said. Another commented that there was always the danger of leakage if too many persons knew what policy decisions were being studied, and therefore some justification for keeping questions narrow, but that the NSC and State Department have carried it too far.

The Washington Star

Monday, March 22, 1976

George Beveridge

The CIA tarnishes the innocent

The only thing wrong with the CIA's pledge to stop using news correspondents as paid sources of intelligence overseas is that the practice should have been halted long ago. This is an alliance in which a free press has no rightful place. And the agency's refusal to identify news people who have served as the CIA's eyes and ears in the past — or are still doing so — leaves some unsettling questions.

One result, as *The Star* has seen in recent weeks, is that the professional integrity of a host of innocent foreign correspondents now seems destined to remain indefinitely under a cloud of suspicion.

On Feb. 9, in the wake of the latest disclosures on CIA-news ties abroad, CIA Chief George Bush announced two decisions:

① Effective immediately, he said, the CIA "will not enter any paid or contractual relationships with any full-time or part-time news correspondents" accredited by news outlets in the United States.

② In a tacit admission of what's been going on, Bush said, the CIA also will move to "bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with the new policy."

The "existing relationships," it appears, involve largely, if not entirely, part-time correspondents, or "stringers." (Newspaper stringers, as distinguished

from full-time, salaried employees, are reporters who are paid for individual articles; often, they service several publications at the same time.)

But the efforts of *The Star* and other newspapers to check out their "stringer lists" with the CIA hit a stone wall. So *The Star*, thwarted on that front, last month shot off to more than 20 of its regular stringers a letter which read, in part, as follows:

"As you may know, it has been acknowledged here by the CIA that some stringers for unidentified U.S. news agencies have been involved with the CIA in ways that go beyond the normal give-and-take of ordinary journalistic activity. This obviously is contrary to our policy.

"Therefore, if you have or in the past have had such a connection — or have been part of any program involving U.S. government agencies, reimbursed or not — we would like to know about it."

George Beveridge is
The Star's ombudsman.

Well, that letter did not call for a response in the absence of such involvements. But voluntary disavowals (10 to date) have been rolling in anyway. And most of the comments reach substantially beyond disavowals.

Stringer Tony Avirgan,

writing from Tanzania, for example, strongly urged *The Star* to continue to "push the CIA to reveal the names of all the journalists who have worked for U.S. intelligence agencies."

"Only when this is done," he said, "will those of us who are engaged in honest journalism be able to partially remove the cloak of suspicion and get on with our work."

From Tehran, stringer Ralph Joseph wrote that such involvements "foul up the entire profession and cast suspicion on all members of the press," to their detriment in dealing with foreign officials.

From Munich, "categorically" denying relationships with the CIA or any other government agency, stringer John Dernberg wrote that the CIA aspersions "were of such a blanket nature" that "I am sufficiently incensed to examine the possibilities of a slander or defamation of character suit."

There is more of the same — and the anger, it seems to me, is justified.

If those views are shared by the press as a whole, however, it is not readily apparent. For the most part the pressures on the CIA for disclosure have simply gone away. Indeed, on two occasions, the newspaper trade journal, *Editor & Publisher*, has opposed it.

"We believe the release of such information," *E&P* said in its Feb. 22 issue,

"would accomplish little except harm the reputations of the persons named and the news organizations for which they worked. It may be charitable, but we believe it is accurate, to say that most of those who helped the CIA and other government agencies in the past, whether journalists or not, did so for patriotic reasons. Times have changed, and patriotism of this kind is misunderstood today."

Well, times have changed, and the *E&P*-attributed motives of patriotism, I suspect, are in the vast majority of cases right.

But there is little consolation in that for the vast majority of news correspondents around the world who, in those earlier times, refrained from such involvements and got on with their jobs of covering the news.

For whatever motives, newsmen who have doubled as CIA agents bear a burden of culpability as heavy as, if not heavier than, that of the intelligence agency which recruited them. And it occurs to me that the over-all response of the press in that regard is just a mite out of kilter with its zeal in exposing the participation of all manner of other people in intelligence activities.

Charity is surely a cardinal virtue. For newspapers, especially, even-handedness is, too.

BALTIMORE SUN
1 April 1976

A Case for Prior Restraint of Publication

By THEODORE VOORHEES

Two thousand years ago, the life of a gladiator in the Colosseum depended on whether the Roman mob induced the emperor to turn one thumb up or down. Until recently our version of such a verdict has been a public titillation by trial by newspaper.

Three methods of securing conviction were available to the prosecutor bent upon achieving a record of constant success. A confession might be published after being procured by the police with a rubber hose. Leakage to the press of a criminal record has been far from uncommon—a person living close to the scene of a crime would be charged solely because of that record, and jurors who read about it might be persuaded of guilt on that record alone. Or a prosecutor could feed newspapers bits of inflammatory evidence until jurors were convinced that the community expected a conviction.

Events in 1963 slowed such practices. President Kennedy was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald, who was stood by the police on a table and grilled by reporters about the crime. Later, the police notified the press of the time when Oswald would move to another prison, enabling Jack Ruby to lynch him.

There followed a realization that a fair trial for the accused demanded a measure of restraint: by police, prosecutor, lawyers and the press. The press fought to establish that under the Constitution it has an absolute right to publish what it chooses and never to be subjected to prior restraint.

No one questions the mandate of the First Amendment, but never in recorded history have newspapers had the right to publish with impunity anything they might choose. Publication of a libel used to mean imprisonment, and today, payment of damages. Some, but not all, indecencies are subject to print. The government has been permitted to interfere with advertising by the media. Sedition and subversion are subject to restraint when they may cause a clear and present danger of government overthrow.

The press defenders carry unyieldingly the banner of no prior restraint. In the confrontation with the Sixth Amendment fair trial guarantee, they insist that every other device be resorted to: change of trial site, questioning of jurors for bias, admonitions to disregard media coverage, sequestration of jury and postponement of trial. They insist that irresponsible reporting can be punished by imposing a payment of damages.

Christian Science Monitor
1 April 1976

Senate committee mum on secret CIA probes? Washington

The Senate Intelligence Committee has decided to keep secret its investigations of controversial Central Intelligence Agency operations, according to committee sources.

The committee intends to release its report in mid-April in the form of general recommendations to curb some questionable CIA activities, but the operations themselves will not be mentioned, the sources said.

Five justices of the Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case pointed out that the press may be subject to criminal sanctions in an appropriate case. Yet the press becomes apoplectic when faced with a court restriction on publication of evidence that might prevent a fair trial. If the Court sustains Justice Blackmun's "gag order" in the current Nebraska Press Association case, we are told, we will see "the erosion of one of the most basic rights of a free people."

Why should this be so? Liberty of the individual is surely as basic as the right of free press. Yet the Constitution has not crumbled nor has liberty been dangerously eroded by judicial exercise of prior restraint in every aspect of the life of the individual.

A person can be enjoined from committing a nuisance which would injure his neighbors, from engaging in strikes, from causing damage to the environment, and from irreparable injury to another by breach of a contract. Such restraints have survived charges of deprivation of property under the Fourteenth Amendment and involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth.

Freedom of the press is of such importance as to warrant a Supreme Court pronouncement that prior restraint carries a presumption of illegality. Yet the presumption should be deemed overcome when publication of prejudicial evidence will jeopardize the fairness of the trial of an accused.



Justification for a newspaper to publish a confession in advance of trial can seldom arise. Even if he confesses before a hundred witnesses, the accused has the right at trial to have the court rule, in the absence of the jury, whether he confessed voluntarily.

If the media broadcasts the confession, the appearance of a fair trial and perhaps the fact are irreparably lost. The excuse offered for the disclosure of the confession or other damaging evidence is the "the people's right to know." This claim of the press has a hollow ring, however, in the light of its own refusal to disclose the name of its informants when that would prove to its disadvantage. Furthermore, the informing of the public is not permanently restrained but only temporarily postponed.

The confession, the past record and inflammatory evidence can be aired to high heaven once the verdict is in. True, by that time, the press has lost the opportunity to affect the outcome, but under our system of constitutionally mandated justice, the control of a trial is for the court alone. The Founding Fathers made no provision for the press to play a part in the conduct of a trial.

Where publication threatens irreparable injury to an individual, the public or the nation, prior restraint of publication should be just as valid as an injunction in any case of similarly serious injury. A person denied a fair trial by the press may languish in prison for the rest of his life. That would be, by anyone's measure, an irreparable injury.

When publication of a new version of the Pentagon Papers might endanger the security of the nation, prior restraint might readily be called for until the danger could be weighed by the court. We have much to learn from the CIA debacle. With advance knowledge of an intention by *Counter Spy* to release the story that blew the cover of Mr. Welch, a court might have restrained that action, and he might be alive today.

It is difficult to believe that responsible elements of the press or electronic media really want to play God in the lives of other people. They, more than most, should reject the contention that the Constitution places anyone beyond the reach of the law. Our society cannot exist with anyone having that much power, not even the press.

Mr. Voorhees is assistant dean of the Catholic University law school.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
22 March 1976

Congressional investigators trying to track down the person who leaked to the press the House Intelligence Committee's final report on CIA operations are finding the task bigger than expected. They believe at least 3,000 copies of the report, many made on duplicating machines outside Congress, are floating about among federal officials.

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DETROIT FREE PRESS
22 March 1976

Support CIA, FBI

I FEEL MORE strongly today than ever that the FBI and the CIA offer me more security than the U.S. Supreme Court and the Congress.

I wonder if the probers could withstand the same scrutiny that has been applied to these agencies. Most of the probing is doing the country great harm.

A most dangerous situation exists in that the judges, especially in the federal courts, are given far too much power.

IRVINE E. MILLER SR.
Westland

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, February 1976

COVERT ACTION=

swampland of American foreign policy

The Chairman of the
Senate Intelligence
Committee finds
in the excesses
of the CIA the
symptoms of an
illusion of American
omnipotence which
has entrapped
and enthralled the
nation's presidents

Frank Church

Two hundred years ago, at the founding of this nation, Thomas Paine observed that "Not a place upon earth might be so happy as America. Her situation is remote from all the wrangling world." I still believe America remains the best place on Earth, but it has long since ceased to be "remote from all the wrangling world."

On the contrary, even our internal economy now depends on events far beyond our shores. The energy crisis, which exposed our vulnerable dependence upon foreign oil, made the point vividly.

It is also tragic but true that our own people can no longer be made safe from savage destruction hurled down upon them from the most hidden and remote regions on Earth. Soviet submarines silently traverse the ocean floors carrying transcontinental missiles with the capacity to strike at our heartland. The nuclear arms race threatens to continue its deadly spiral toward Armageddon.

In this dangerous setting, it is imperative for the United States to maintain a strong and effective intelligence service. On this proposition we can ill-afford to be of two minds. We have no choice other than to gather, analyze, and assess—to the best of our abilities—vital informa-

tion on the intent and prowess of foreign adversaries, present or potential.

Without an adequate intelligence-gathering apparatus, we would be unable to gauge with confidence our defense requirements; unable to conduct an informed foreign policy; unable to control, through satellite surveillance, a runaway nuclear arms race. "The winds and waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators," wrote Gibbon. Those nations without a skillful intelligence service must navigate beneath a clouded sky.

With this truth in mind, the United States established, by the National Security Act of 1947, a Central Intelligence Agency to collect and evaluate intelligence, and provide for its proper dissemination within the government. The CIA was to be a clearing house for other U.S. intelligence agencies, including those of the State Department and the various military services. It was to be an independent, civilian intelligence agency whose duty it was, in the words of Allen Dulles, CIA Director from 1953-1961:

To weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty.

"The Central Intelligence Agency," concluded Dulles, "should have nothing to do with policy." In this way, neither the President nor the Congress would be left with any of the frequently self-interested intelligence assessments afforded by the Pentagon and the State Department, to rely upon.

In its efforts to get at the hard facts, the CIA has performed unevenly. It has had its successes and its failures. The CIA has detected the important new Soviet weapons systems early on; but it has often over-estimated the growth of the Russian ICBM

forces. The CIA has successfully monitored Soviet adherence to arms control agreements, and given us the confidence to take steps toward further limitations; but it has been unable to predict the imminence of several international conflicts, such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In a word, though it deserves passing marks for its intelligence work, the CIA has certainly not been infallible.

While one may debate the quality of the agency's performance, there has never been any question about the propriety and necessity of its involvement in the process of gathering and evaluating foreign intelligence. Nor have serious questions been raised about the means used to acquire such information, whether from overt sources, technical devices, or by clandestine methods.

What has become controversial is quite unrelated to intelligence, but has to do instead with the so-called covert operations of the CIA, those secret efforts to manipulate events within foreign countries in ways presumed to serve the interests of the United States. Nowhere are such activities vouchsafed in the statutory language which created the Agency in 1947. "No indication was given in the statute that the CIA would become a vehicle for foreign political action or clandestine political warfare," notes Harry Howe Ransom, a scholar who has written widely and thought deeply about the problems of intelligence in modern society. Ransom concludes that "probably no other organization of the federal government has taken such liberties in interpreting its legally assigned functions as has the CIA."

The legal basis for this political action arm of the CIA is very much open to question. Certainly the legislative history of the 1947 Act fails to indicate that Congress anticipated the CIA would ever engage in covert political warfare abroad.

The CIA points to a catch-all phrase contained in the 1947 Act as a rationalization for its operational prerogatives. A clause in the statute permits the Agency "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may, from time to time, direct." These vague and seemingly innocuous words have been seized upon as the green light for CIA intervention around the world.

Moreover, these interventions into the political affairs of foreign countries soon came to overshadow the Agency's original purpose of gathering and evaluating information. Just

consider how far afield we strayed. For example:

- We deposed the government of Guatemala when its leftist leanings displeased us;
 - We attempted to ignite a civil war against Sukarno in Indonesia;
 - We intervened to restore the Shah to his throne in Iran, after Mossadegh broke the monopoly grip of British Petroleum over Iranian oil;
 - We attempted to launch a counter-revolution in Cuba through the abortive landing of an army of exiles at the Bay of Pigs;
 - We even conducted a secret war in Laos, paying Meo tribesmen and Thai mercenaries to do our fighting there.
- All these engagements were initiated without the knowledge or consent of Congress. No country was too small, no foreign leader too trifling, to escape our attention.
- We sent a deadly toxin to the Congo with the purpose of injecting Lumumba with a fatal disease;
 - We armed local dissidents in the Dominican Republic, knowing their purpose to be the assassination of Trujillo;
 - We participated in a military coup overturning the very government we were pledged to defend in South Vietnam; and when Premier Diem resisted, he and his brother were murdered by the very generals to whom we gave money and support;
 - We attempted for years to assassinate Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders. The various plots spanned three Administrations, and involved an extended collaboration between the CIA and the Mafia.

Whatever led the United States to such extremes? Assassination is nothing less than an act of war, and our targets were leaders of small, weak countries that could not possibly threaten the United States. Only once did Castro become an accessory to a threat, by permitting the Soviets to install missiles on Cuban soil within range of the United States. And this was the one time when the CIA called off all attempts against his life.

The roots of these malignant plots grew out of the obsessions of the Cold War. When the CIA succeeded the Office of Strategic Services of World War II, Stalin replaced Hitler as the Devil Incarnate. Wartime methods were routinely adopted for peacetime use.

In those myopic years, the world was seen as up for grabs between the United States and the Soviet Union. Castro's Cuba raised the specter of a Soviet outpost at America's doorstep. Events in the Dominican Republic appeared to offer an additional opportunity for the Soviets and their allies. The Congo, freed

from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic center of the African continent, and the prospect of Soviet penetration there was viewed as a threat to U.S. interests in emerging Africa. There was a great concern that a communist takeover in Indochina would have a "domino effect" throughout Asia. Even the lawful election in 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was still seen by some as the equivalent of Castro's conquest of Cuba.

In the words of a former Secretary of State, "A desperate struggle [was] going on in the back alleys of world politics." Every upheaval, wherever it occurred, was likened to a pawn on a global chessboard, to be moved this way or that, by the two principal players. This led the CIA to plunge into a full range of covert activities designed to counteract the competitive efforts of the Soviet KGB.

Thus, the United States came to adopt the methods and accept the value system of the "enemy." In the secret world of covert action, we threw off all restraints. Not content merely to discreetly subsidize foreign political parties, labor unions, and newspapers, the Central Intelligence Agency soon began to directly manipulate the internal politics of other countries. Spending many millions of dollars annually, the CIA filled its bag with dirty tricks, ranging from bribery and false propaganda to schemes to "alter the health" of unfriendly foreign leaders and undermine their regimes.

No where is this imitation of KGB tactics better demonstrated than in the directives sent to CIA agents in the Congo in 1960. Instructions to kill the African leader Lumumba were sent via diplomatic pouch, along with rubber gloves, a mask, syringe, and a lethal biological material. The poison was to be injected into some substance that Lumumba would ingest, whether food or toothpaste. Before this plan was implemented, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. Nevertheless, our actions had fulfilled the prophecy of George Williams, an eminent theologian at the Harvard Divinity School, who once warned, "Be cautious when you choose your enemy, for you will grow more like him."

The imperial view from the White House reached its arrogant summits during the Administration of Richard Nixon. On September 15, 1970, following the election of Allende to be President of Chile, Richard Nixon summoned Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms, and John Mitchell to the White House. The topic was Chile. Allende, Nixon stated, was unacceptable to the President of the United States.

In his handwritten notes for this meeting, Nixon indicated that he

was "not concerned" with the risks involved. As CIA Director Helms recalled in testimony before the Senate Committee, "The President came down very hard that he wanted something done, and he didn't care how." To Helms, the order had been all-inclusive. "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office," he recalled, "it was that day." Thus, the President of the United States had given orders to the CIA to prevent the popularly-elected President of Chile from entering office.

To bar Allende from the Presidency, a military coup was organized, with the CIA playing a direct role in the planning. One of the major obstacles to the success of the mission was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted that Chile's constitution be upheld. As a result of his stand, the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the coup plans. Unable to get General Schneider to resign, conspirators in Chile decided to kidnap him. Machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to a group of kidnappers on October 22, 1970. That same day General Schneider was mortally wounded on his way to work in an attempted kidnap, apparently by a group affiliated with the one provided weapons by the CIA.

The plot to kidnap General Schneider was but one of many efforts to subvert the Allende regime. The United States sought also to bring the Chilean economy under Allende to its knees. In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger, our Ambassador wrote that:

Not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile.

The ultimate outcome, as you know, of these and other efforts to destroy the Allende government was a bloodbath which included the death of Allende and the installation, in his place, of a repressive military dictatorship.

Why Chile? What can possibly explain or justify such an intrusion upon the right of the Chilean people to self-determination? The country itself was no threat to us. It has been aptly characterized as a "dagger pointed straight at the heart of Antarctica."

Was it to protect American-owned big business? We now know that I.T.T. offered the CIA a million

dollars to prevent the ratification of Allende's election by the Chilean Congress. Quite properly, this offer was rejected. But the CIA then spent much more on its own, in an effort to accomplish the same general objective.

Yet, if our purpose was to save the properties of large U.S. corporations, that cause had already been lost. The nationalization of the mines was decided well before Allende's election; and the question of compensation was tempered by insurance against confiscatory losses issued to the companies by the U.S. government itself.

No, the only plausible explanation for our intervention in Chile is the persistence of the myth that communism is a single, hydra-headed serpent, and that it remains our duty to cut off each ugly head, wherever and however it may appear.

Ever since the end of World War II, we have justified our mindless meddling in the affairs of others on the ground that since the Soviets do it, we must do it, too. The time is at hand to re-examine that thesis.

Before Chile, we insisted that communism had never been freely chosen by any people, but forced upon them against their will. The communists countered that they resorted to revolution because the United States would never permit the establishment of a communist regime by peaceful means.

In Chile, President Nixon confirmed the communist thesis. Like Caesar peering into the colonies from distant Rome, Nixon said the choice of government by the Chileans was unacceptable to the President of the United States.

The attitude in the White House seemed to be: If—in the wake of Vietnam—I can no longer send the Marines, then I will send in the CIA.

But what have we gained by our policy of consummate intervention, compared to what we have lost?

- A "friendly" Iran and Indonesia, members of the OPEC cartel, which imposes extortionate prices on the Western World for indispensable oil?

- A hostile Laos that preferred the indigenous forces of communism to control imposed by Westerners, which smacked of the hated colonialism against which they had fought so long to overthrow?

- A fascist Chile, with thousands of political prisoners languishing in their jails, mocking the professed ideals of the United States throughout the hemisphere?

If we have gained little, what then have we lost? I suggest we have lost—or grievously impaired—the good name and reputation of the United States from which we once drew a unique capacity to exercise matchless moral leadership. Where once we were admired, now we are resented. Where once we were welcome, now we are tolerated, at best. In the eyes of millions of once friendly foreign people, the United States is today regarded with grave suspicion and distrust.

What else can account for the startling decline in American prestige? Certainly not the collapse of our military strength, for our firepower has grown immensely since the end of World War II.

I must lay the blame, in large measure, to the fantasy that it lay within our power to control other countries through the covert manipulation of their affairs. It formed part of a greater illusion that entrapped and enthralled our Presidents: the illusion of American omnipotence.

Nevertheless, I do not draw the conclusion of those who now argue that all U.S. covert operations must be banned in the future. I can conceive of a dire emergency when

timely clandestine action on our part might avert a nuclear holocaust and save an entire civilization.

I can also conceive of circumstances, such as those existing in Portugal today, where our discreet help to democratic political parties might avert a forcible take-over by a communist minority, heavily subsidized by the Soviets. In Portugal, such a bitterly-unwanted, Marxist regime is being resisted courageously by a people who earlier voted 84 percent against it.

But these are covert operations consistent either with the imperative of national survival or with our traditional belief in free government. If our hand were exposed helping a foreign people in their struggle to be free, we could scorn the cynical doctrine of "plausible denial," and say openly, "Yes, we were there—and proud of it."

We were there in Western Europe, helping to restore democratic governments in the aftermath of World War II. It was only after our faith gave way to fear that we began to act as a self-appointed sentinel of the status quo.

Then it was that all the dark arts of secret intervention—bribery, blackmail, abduction, assassination—were put to the service of reactionary and repressive regimes that can never, for long, escape or withstand the volcanic forces of change.

And the United States, as a result, became ever more identified with the claims of the old order, instead of the aspirations of the new.

The remedy is clear. American foreign policy, whether openly or secretly pursued, must be made to conform once more to our historic ideals, the same fundamental belief in freedom and popular government that once made us a beacon of hope for the downtrodden and oppressed throughout the world. □

WASHINGTON STAR
14 MARCH 1976

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Signed
William Charles Seranek Jr.

WASHINGTON POST
30 MAR 1976

Vice Admiral to Get CIA Post

Associated Press
Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush yesterday named a former commander of the Sixth Fleet to be his deputy for relations with other intelligence agencies and called the appointment an important step in reorganizing the intelligence community. Vice Adm. Daniel J. Murphy "will direct the day-to-day business of the [intelligence] community staff and has particular responsibility for the management of resources devoted to U.S. intelligence activities," Bush

said in a statement.

Murphy, 54, will be Bush's second deputy under President Ford's executive order to reorganize U.S. intelligence agencies. The other is Army Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, who has been deputy CIA director for several years.

In his statement, Bush said Murphy "has been appointed to the post of deputy to the director of central intelligence for the intelligence community. The appointment represents an important step in advancing

the President's program for reorganization of the intelligence community."

In addition to commanding the Sixth Fleet, Murphy has been military assistant to the Secretary of Defense and director of antisubmarine warfare and ocean surveillance programs in the office of the chief of naval operations.

Murphy has spent 33 years in the Navy and holds the Secretary of Defense distinguished service medal and the Legion of Merit with a gold star.

Sunday, March 21, 1976

The Washington Star

The Schorr Case: Look to Motives — and Wonder

By I. F. Stone

One of the first steps in solving a crime is to determine who benefited by it. The chief beneficiaries in the leak of the Pike Committee report on intelligence were the intelligence agencies themselves. The report turned up on the CBS evening news Sunday, Jan. 25, and in the first editions that same evening of the *New York Times* for Monday, Jan. 26. When the House of Representatives met in Washington at noon next day, the minority on the Pike Committee launched the attack which led three days later to the vote against release of the report.

I.F. Stone, who long published the influential newsletter I.F. Stone's Weekly, is a contributing editor of the *New York Review of Books*.

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Logic, probabilities, and the circumstantial are not proof. Folly can never be excluded. But an examination of the strange circumstances in which the report was suppressed may put newspapermen on their guard and show the public what we are all up against in dealing with secret agencies.

The Pike Committee voted 9-4 on the afternoon of Friday, Jan. 23, to release its report. Everything was ready for publication after months of hard work and agonizing hassles with the intelligence agencies and the executive branch. The majority of the committee and the staff were triumphant. The last hurdles to publication seemed to have been safely cleared.

Yet that very weekend someone leaked a copy of the report to the *New York Times* and to Daniel Schorr of CBS, giving the intelligence agencies their chance to discredit the committee and block release of the report.

This leak was not, repeat not, a leak to thwart censorship. Under the rules of the House and the resolution establishing its Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee), that 9-4 vote on Friday afternoon, Jan. 23, was all that was needed to release the report. The committee did not have to go to the Rules Committee for permission, nor did it need a vote of the House to make the report public. The report would have been released automatically as soon as copies came back from the printer. It was the leak that did the committee in.

At the time of the leak, the *Times* and CBS were not giving the public information that would otherwise have been suppressed. They were merely getting the report in advance

of their competitors. At that point, their news stories were a beat, not a public service. Indeed, as soon became clear, it was a public disservice to jump the gun by a few days on official release of the report at the cost of giving its enemies — and the enemies of the press — just the opportunity they were looking for.

The leak fit beautifully with a well-synchronized attack by the enemies of the report. On Monday morning, Jan. 26, Daniel Schorr showed his copy of the Pike report on the CBS morning news and the *Times* arrived in Washington with extensive stories on what the report contained. This coincided — whether by accident or design — with plans which seem to have been already made for an onslaught that very day on the floor of the House.

The leaks to the *Times* and CBS, were brought up over and over again by Congressman McClory of Illinois, the ranking Republican on the Pike Committee, and by his supporters. The final speaker, the Republican minority leader, Rhodes of Arizona, summed it all up by saying that the executive branch "charged with our national security" could not be expected "to confide in a Congress that is a direct conduit to the public press and rushes to the media to divulge every particle of information it receives." In a phrase worthy of the best on Madison Avenue, Rhodes said the public's right to know did not give Congress "the right to blab." Even soap has never been sold more skillfully.

This is the theme song of the counterattack orchestrated by the intelligence agencies — the new-speak of the CIA and FBI. Congressional control is to be stigmatized as a "blabbermouth" operation. Attention is to be focused not on the abuses of secret government but on those who criticize and expose them. And if there isn't enough "blabbing" from Congress we may expect the intelligence agencies to do the blabbing themselves and blame it on Congress and the press.

The government itself has always been the foremost leaker. The chief value of the classification system is the wide leeway it gives the government for manipulating the public mind by selective declassification. But this is only one of its many uses.

One way to undercut a congressional investigation is to beat it to the punch by leaking part of the story in advance. It makes the later official revelation sound like old-hat news. It leaves the congressional report, when and if it comes, to be greeted by "ho hum, so what's new?"

A lot of the "leaks," as many newspapermen know, have come from the executive branch and the intelligence agencies themselves. One of the biggest "leaks," which hurt the Pike Committee last November, was the

leak to Schorr at CBS and to the *Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor* of the tragic story of how the CIA sold the poor Kurds down the river, first giving them secret support against Iraq and then cutting it off when that suited the Shah of Iran's power politics. Pike Committee sources claim that there were hitherto unknown details in the *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor* reports of the Kurd story which were new even to its own investigators, details which led them to suspect that the leaks must have come from an intelligence agency.

Schorr broke the Kurdish story on CBS news on the Saturday night before it appeared in the *Times* and the *Monitor*. Mitchell Rogovin, special counsel to the CIA, phoned a Pike Committee staff official that Saturday morning and asked him to stop Schorr from telling the story on TV that night. The Pike Committee official, who had not been aware that the Kurdish story had leaked, asked himself whether that telephone call was a cute way to divert suspicion from the CIA as the source. That is the kind of question naturally bred by the CIA's capacity for murky and labyrinthine manipulations. The CIA was aware that nothing had so angered the Pike Committee as the Kurdish tragedy — this was a subject on which there was no minority — and some Pike Committee members believe that the intelligence agencies leaked it in advance to defuse the coming committee report.

The Kurdish story leaked the very weekend in November that CIA Director William Colby was fired by Ford. The *New York Times* in publishing it gave "a senior intelligence official" as its source. While the leak was later used to smear the Pike Committee, the target of the intelligence official in leaking it was Kissinger, who was Nixon's willing accomplice in this tragic bit of "realpolitik."

The executive branch and the intelligence agencies had a motive, and the intelligence agencies had ample means, to leak the Pike report in advance. There were several versions of the Pike Committee report as it went through repeated and prolonged revision in hassles with the various executive and intelligence agencies involved. There were close to 2,000 copies of various versions circulating in the White House and the federal agencies for the purpose of pinpointing security matters and arguing for various kinds of deletions. Copies were even sent to many embassies abroad. A leak could easily have been arranged in those quarters and been far harder to trace than a leak inside the Pike Committee, where there were only enough copies for each of the 13 members and perhaps a half-dozen copies for staff use. Yet a staff leak cannot be excluded.

This brings us to a new problem, of

which the public has not been aware, and that is the problem of "detail-ees." The word "detail-ee" is a new word I don't believe anybody ever heard used publicly until the Pike Committee report. The word seems to have been added to the lexicon by the CIA. It is a bureaucratic euphemism for a certain kind of infiltrator, an intelligence agent who is slipped into other branches of the government, sometimes openly, sometimes covertly. Sometimes he is semicovert — his identity being disclosed only to the head of the department or office to which he has been "detailed."

Were there "detail-ees" operating covertly on the Pike Committee staff, or in the federal agencies that had access to the report, and did they have any part in leaking it? Schorr and the *New York Times* reporters may well have been unaware of the real affiliation, or hidden loyalties, of their secret "source." I'm sure they would not have lent themselves knowingly to a leak which had been set up by the CIA to undermine the committee and thwart the public interest.

(It should be noted here that, whatever the origins or motives of those who leaked the report, once the House voted for suppression, Schorr and the *Village Voice* performed a public service by getting the contents published. They acted to print the text only after the House vote to suppress, when there was clearly a duty to make the text available.)

There are two dangerous precedents for newsmen in the Schorr case. The first lies in Schorr's suspension by CBS on the ground that he has put himself in an adversary position with the government. A newsmen was intended — shades of Jefferson! — to be in an adversary position to government. To let Schorr's suspension go unchallenged is to give corporate media employers an excuse to get rid of reporters who

get in wrong with the powers that be. I do not understand why the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* (which have attacked Schorr) do not see this: If they had acted like CBS, the former would have suspended Woodward and Bernstein and the latter Seymour Hersh.

Why shouldn't Schorr be able to fight back as a reporter for, and on, CBS and expose the evils of secrecy in government instead of being placed on the defensive and put in isolation as "controversial"?

The other dangerous precedent lies in the sanctions which the House witch-hunters hope to apply. The House does not have a legal leg to stand on if it tries to prosecute Schorr. The power to classify rests on shaky grounds in the executive branch; there are no grounds at all for classification in Congress. The only way the House can punish Schorr is to take away his credentials as a correspondent and thus his job. This is exactly the punishment sought in the investigation by that House Ethics Committee which was originally set up to police congressmen, not newspapermen, and which in almost a decade of existence has never before even bothered to obtain subpoena power or hire a full staff.

If covering Congress is a privilege, not a right — if the price of a newsmen's job is acquiescing in arbitrary congressional censorship — then the Congress and the intelligence agencies operating through Congress have another way to draw the press itself into the conspiracy of silence and to intimidate newsmen.

There was a time when parliamentary proceedings were privileged. Before 1771 reporters and printers could be punished for reporting the proceedings of the House of Commons without its permission. In this Bicentennial year it is worth recalling that John Wilkes, the best friend

the rebellious American colonists had in the House of Commons, established the right to cover parliamentary proceedings. As sheriff of London, he successfully prevented the arrest of a printer the House charged with publishing its debates. That "lawlessness" in defense of a free press was one of the great moments of English history.

Congressman Stratton of New York says reporters must obey the law. Of course, they must. But there may be times when the public interest imposes on them a duty to risk breaking secrecy rules.

Stratton kept talking of Rule X of the House. He said that under it "the privileges of the House concern the integrity of our proceedings." The Constitution says Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of the press. Which is to prevail, a rule of the House or the First Amendment? If the secrecy miasma is to spread from the executive branch into the legislative, where does the duty of a free press lie? In submitting, and letting free government go down the drain?

The heart of the evil lies in the "dirty tricks" in which the CIA has specialized and which other intelligence agencies, especially the FBI, have also practiced. A government cannot carry on lawless activity in public. If it is going to use assassination, burglary, bribery, corruption of elections, agents provocateurs, covert slander, it can only do so in secret. There is no way for Congress to "oversee" such activities without revealing them and opposing them. To allow "dirty tricks" is not only to make real oversight impossible but to make Congress an accomplice in lawlessness.

That is the rock-bottom issue which has to be faced in the debate over the intelligence agencies, and very few are facing it.

So Mr Dayan's argument that Israel should buy fewer conventional weapons and concentrate on nuclear ones has considerable appeal. Those who argue that Israel's nuclear alternative should be brought out into the open suggest that this would provide an exit from the cut-de-sac in which Mr Kissinger's step-by-step approach seems to have vanished. Israel, according to this theory, could offer substantial territorial concessions, in return for some no-war formula, without having to rely on international guarantees which it does not trust; the crippling tax burden could be eased and a halt called to the arms race.

A strong argument against the new nuclear thinking is that it is not new. The superpowers followed this line and it cost them more, not less, and did not diminish their need for conventional weapons. Their experience in substituting cold wars for hot is not necessarily attributable to nuclear weapons; nor is there any reason to believe that their experience could be transferred to the Middle East. The Americans might shut off the flow of conventional arms aid if Israel tried out active nuclear diplomacy. The argument is only beginning; a lot more will be heard before Israel decides whether to become a nuclear power openly.

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 20, 1976

Not nuclear—yet

For 10 years Israel has doggedly denied possessing nuclear weapons. On Sunday Mr Rabin, the prime minister, was still reiterating the sacred formula: Israel is not a nuclear power and will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. But this was after Mr Moshe Dayan, the former defence minister, had said in Tel Aviv that Israel had reached the limit of its ability to absorb conventional weapons and must now try for a nuclear option. Mr Dayan argued that the Arabs must be made to realise that if Israel's survival were at stake it could threaten the Arabs with at least equal destruction.

On March 11th a CIA official said at a disputedly private briefing that Israel is already estimated to have 10-20 nuclear weapons ready to use. The *New York Times* published these figures, saying it had been given permission. When tackled about this, Mr George Bush, the CIA's new director, took full responsibility for the disclosure but said that there had been an understanding that it would not be published. A routine Israeli disclaimer followed.

The background to Mr Dayan's bombshell is a dispute among Israel's military men over a new defence doctrine. With new Soviet arms coming to Syria, and the prospect of western

ones to Egypt, Israel feels itself hard pressed to keep up even the one-to-three ratio against the Arabs that the United States believes is enough for safety. Last week Mr Shimon Peres, the defence minister, made the first official reference ever to the size of the armed forces, putting them at around the size of the Jewish population on the eve of the country's independence in 1948. This means about 650,000 men and women, or almost one in four Israelis, on active service or in the reserves.

Even with American assistance, Israel has neither the money to buy the conventional weapons it thinks it needs to counterbalance total Arab strength (and the space to store them) nor the manpower to maintain and operate them. Israel's military shopping list is so enormous that the Americans have been asking, only half in jest, what on earth it proposes to do with all the weapons it is getting. Reservists these days do extra time greasing and polishing in the arms depots, and the army keeps on appealing for more volunteers for maintenance. Both the prime minister and the finance minister have been trying to cut defence spending, which consumes more than a third of the country's gross national product.

Los Angeles Times
Sun., Mar. 28, 1976

Defected Russ Agent Still a Mystery Man

Ex-KGB Official Kept
in Solitary by Wary
CIA for Three Years

BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—Somewhere in the United States, living under an assumed name, is a former Soviet secret police official whom the CIA kept in solitary confinement for three years for fear he was a double agent—not a bona fide defector.

Yet during that time, the Russian, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko:

—Became an important source of information the Warren Commission's investigation of President John F. Kennedy's assassination.

—Fingered Samuel Adason Jaffe, an American journalist, as a KGB agent, creating a cloud of suspicion in the American intelligence community that the former CBS and ABC correspondent has spent seven years trying to dispel.

Although the Warren Commission relied heavily on Nosenko's statements that Lee Harvey Oswald was not a Soviet agent, the FBI never informed the commission of Nosenko's confinement or of the suspicions that he might be a double agent.

The Rockefeller commission on CIA abuses reported last year that a Soviet defector, whom it did not identify, had been held "in solitary confinement under spartan living conditions" for three years. CIA and commission sources told The Times that Nosenko was the defector.

Jaffe, now a free-lance journalist living in Bethesda, Md., first learned of Nosenko's allegations about him when he was interrogated by FBI agents in Washington in 1969. The questioning centered on Jaffe's activities while serving as ABC-TV correspondent in Moscow.

Jaffe, who had been considered a reliable source by both CIA and FBI agents with whom he had worked as a journalist, acknowledged using KGB agents as sources during his work as a correspondent but denied giving them vital or secret information.

Nosenko is a former KGB lieutenant colonel who defected in February, 1964, about 10 weeks after Kennedy's assassination.

Now, declassified CIA and FBI documents give a rare glimpse into the world of intelligence as lived by Nosenko, the defector, and Jaffe, the journalist.

In the first week of February,

1964, Nosenko was a member of the Soviet delegation to a 17-nation disarmament conference in Geneva, Switzerland. Then 36, he was husky, handsome and dark-haired, with heavy eyebrows. He spoke badly broken English.

At that time Jaffe, having left an earlier post with CBS, was ABC's correspondent in Moscow. Then 37, he was a nice-looking, gregarious journalist, with thick red hair.

Although Nosenko had supervised KGB operations against foreign visitors, he and Jaffe had apparently never met. But Nosenko had access to documents that showed Jaffe had met with other KGB officials.

On Feb. 4, 1964, about 1 p.m., Geneva time, Nosenko suddenly disappeared from the Soviet delegation's headquarters at the Rex Hotel.

Six days later, the State Department announced in Washington that Nosenko had defected and was being granted asylum in the United States. Intelligence sources described the defection as one of the most important intelligence triumphs since World War II.

Nosenko reportedly left behind in Russia a wife and two children. He was described at the time as an expert on disarmament and as an admirer of the Western European way of life, but little else was publicly disclosed.

Recently, however, it has been learned that Nosenko claimed to have directed the KGB in the sexual entrapment of several foreigners in Moscow in the late 1950s. A heavily censored CIA document released recently under the Freedom of Information Act said:

"In September, 1958, he claimed to have personally recruited (blank). It was also in 1958, he said, that he supervised the sexual entrapment of (blank) . . .

—"Beginning in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents Yefremov and Volkov in a series of successful entrapments (blanks) . . .

"Nosenko stated that he also used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit . . .

"Finally, Nosenko said, he recruited the Moscow representative (blanks) . . .

"Nosenko claimed that his operational success during 1959 earned him a commendation from the KGB chairman."

Regardless of what other intelligence Nosenko might have possessed, his knowledge of the KGB's surveillance of Oswald in Russia was considered vital. It had been only 10 weeks since the Kennedy assassination and the Warren Commission was in the early stages of its lengthy investigation to try to determine whether there had been a conspiracy.

When the Rockefeller commission released its report on CIA abuses in June, 1975, it gave no clues to Nosenko's identity. But without naming him, it said:

"The CIA maintained the long confinement because of doubts about the

bona fides of the defector. This confinement was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence; and the FBI, attorney general, U.S. Intelligence Board and selected members of Congress were aware to some extent of the confinement."

The CIA refused to say whether Nosenko was in confinement or under any duress when he gave his statements about Oswald and Jaffe. And the Rockefeller commission made no mention of the treatment accorded Nosenko while in confinement, although it reported that in another case a defector was "physically abused."

The CIA's official position is that what it calls Nosenko's "bona fides" (credentials as a defector) had been verified by the time of his release from confinement.

However, some U.S. intelligence officials still express doubts. A former high ranking CIA official recently told The Times that even after three years of "adversary interrogation" by the CIA, Nosenko remained under suspicion by some CIA officials.

CIA documents recently released under the Freedom of Information Act raised questions about some of Nosenko's statements to the FBI and concluded that Nosenko's ignorance of Oswald's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington "discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with Oswald."

Nosenko never testified before the Warren Commission and was not listed in the commission's published report. The commission relied on lengthy statements given to the FBI by Nosenko, who told of the KGB's surveillance of Oswald when he was living in Russia before the Kennedy assassination.

Nor did Nosenko testify before the Rockefeller commission. The commission depended upon information from Nosenko supplied by the CIA.

Neither the Senate Intelligence Committee nor its House counterpart called Nosenko as a witness.

Jaffe, described in one CIA memo as "persistent and energetic," has tried to persuade congressional investigators to get to the bottom of his entanglement with intelligence agencies. But his case has received scant attention from either committee.

The former correspondent, who was interrogated at length by the FBI in 1969, recently prevailed upon the CIA to write a letter which, in effect, says it has no evidence he was ever a foreign intelligence agent.

And after repeated inquiries by Jaffe and The Times about whether the FBI had such evidence, FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley has written a similar letter to Jaffe.

Utilizing the Freedom of Information Act, Jaffe obtained voluminous CIA and FBI documents detailing how he cooperated extensively with both intelligence agencies during the 1950's and 1960's in providing information about his contacts as a journalist with Russian and Chinese Com-

munists.

"I've been suspected of being everything—CIA, FBI, KGB—you name it," Jaffe says. "And I've done nothing except what many other journalists have done."

The records also show how Jaffe, in his journalistic endeavors, dealt with the KGB while stationed in Moscow and how he immediately informed the American Embassy after a KGB official had tried to recruit him as a secret agent.

The documents detail a KGB effort in October, 1962, to blackmail Jaffe after he and a Russian woman he was dating were involved in a car accident.

And they show how Jaffe's KGB contact warned the correspondent that Nosenko had defected and would probably finger him as a KGB agent. And indeed Nosenko did.

Nosenko said that when he defected he was deputy chief of the Tourist Department, second chief directorate of the Committee for State Security, which is concerned with internal security.

Nosenko told the FBI that he had supervised the handling of the KGB file on Oswald in the Tourist Department and could provide information on Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union between 1959 and 1962.

The gist of Nosenko's statements was that the KGB never even considered using Oswald as an agent. On the contrary, he said, it considered him mentally unstable and not very bright.

Nosenko told of a suicide attempt by Oswald after his request to remain in Russia was rejected by Soviet authorities.

"Oswald had locked himself in his room and when entry was made to his room Oswald was found bleeding from self-inflicted wounds to his wrists," an FBI memo to the Warren Commission said. "Nosenko stated Oswald was rushed to a hospital, and Nosenko expressed the opinion that if Oswald had not received immediate medical assistance he would have died."

After Oswald's release from the hospital, he threatened suicide again upon being told that he could not remain permanently in the Soviet Union, Nosenko said. At this point, Nosenko said, the second directorate of the KGB "washed its hands of Oswald."

Nosenko said that although Oswald was permitted to remain temporarily in the Soviet Union, KGB agents were instructed "to maintain a discreet check" on his activities in Minsk, where he lived with his Russian wife, Marina.

"Nosenko commented that the possibility that Oswald might be a 'sleeper agent' for American intelligence had been considered by the KGB but at this time the interest of KGB headquarters in Oswald was practically nil," according to the FBI memo.

Nosenko said he did not know who had granted Oswald permission to reside temporarily in Russia, but said he was sure it had not been a KGB decision.

He went on to say that, after Oswald and his wife left the Soviet Union for the United States in June, 1962, he had not heard of Oswald again until receiving word in September, 1963, that he had applied for a reentry visa at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

"Nosenko's department had no interest in Oswald," the statement continued, "and recommended that Oswald's request . . . be denied." The request was denied.

Although Nosenko said he did not know whom Oswald contacted at the embassy in Mexico City, the CIA, in a recently declassified document, reported it had learned from independent sources that the contact was "a KGB officer under consular cover."

Nosenko said Oswald's name did not come up again until the KGB was notified that he had been arrested in the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination of President Kennedy.

On orders of Gen. Oleg M. Gribanov, chief of the KGB's second Chief directorate, Nosenko said, he telephoned the KGB office in Minsk to get a summary of the Oswald file.

The summary concluded with a statement that the KGB at Minsk had endeavored "to influence Oswald in the right direction."

That "greatly disturbed" Gribanov, according to Nosenko, because the KGB had been under orders to take no action except to "passively observe" Oswald's activities.

On Gribanov's orders, Oswald's complete file, together with an explanation of the concluding statement, was flown by military aircraft from Minsk to Moscow. Nosenko said he reviewed the entire file before giving it to Gribanov, who forwarded it through channels to Premier S. Nikita S. Khrushchev.

The explanation, Nosenko said, was that an uncle of Marina Oswald voluntarily approached Oswald and suggested that he "not be too critical of the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States."

The FBI memo noted:

"Nosenko commented that when the KGB at Minsk was first requested to furnish a summary of the Oswald file it was unaware of the international significance of Oswald's activities and had included the statement reporting their endeavors to influence Oswald as a self-serving effort to impress the KGB Center."

Nosenko also told the FBI that Marina Oswald had not been employed as an agent of the KGB. He said she had been a member of the Komsomol

(Communist Party Youth Organization) but had been dropped from the rolls on an unknown date for non-payment of dues over a long period of time.

Although Nosenko never appeared before the Warren Commission, he expressed a willingness to testify, the FBI said, as long as it would be "in secret and absolutely no publicity is given either to his appearance before the commission or to the information itself."

Neither the CIA nor the FBI will discuss Nosenko's confinement. But a former CIA official told The Times that Nosenko was not put in confinement until four or five months after his defection. For at least three years thereafter, Nosenko was interrogated periodically.

At least as late as Jan. 5, 1968, the CIA was still subjecting Nosenko to interrogation about his knowledge of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union and the KGB's relationship with him. On that day he was required to answer some questions in his own handwriting.

Since his defection in 1964, Nosenko is known to have surfaced in a public way only once—in May, 1970, when he walked into a Reader's Digest office in Washington and offered to assist John Barron with his book, "KGB the Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents."

"I forget the date," Barron said in an interview, "but one morning a rather handsome, distinguished-looking man who spoke in a Slavic accent arrived in my office here and said, 'I am from the center.' In KGB jargon that means headquarters."

Barron said Nosenko told him he had read in Reader's Digest that Barron was writing a book on the KGB and he wanted to offer his assistance.

"I had asked the CIA earlier if we could be provided with Nosenko's address so we could communicate with him, but had been told he didn't wish to communicate with a journalist," Barron said.

Barron, who interviewed Nosenko several times in subsequent months, considered Nosenko a "gold mine" of information and quoted him several times in the book.

"He was very straightforward in telling me there were certain areas that he was not free to get into, but was good in making distinctions between what he knew as a result of his own experiences and observations as opposed to what he heard," Barron said.

Nosenko is believed to live in the Washington area.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
20 March 1976

Bush Backs Colby on Funds

WASHINGTON, March 19 (UPI)—George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, backed his predecessor, William E. Colby, today in refusing to divulge the agency's budget because "I don't want to help" Soviet intelligence. Mr. Bush told the National Newspaper Association, "Our budget figures are not made public."

An EX-CIA Man's Stunning Revelations On "The Company," JFK's Murder, And The Plot To Kill Richard Nixon

Argosy Interview: Gary Klemming

County Council. He might just as well be paid to go. Last year, this county had about 100,000 visitors, and the Chamber of Commerce has been doing a lot of work to attract them. It is a pity that the county council should be so stingy as to refuse to pay him for his services. The county council should be more generous and pay him a reasonable salary for his services. The county council should be more generous and pay him a reasonable salary for his services.

As the resolution of the political conflict increases, the political environment shifts in the direction of political liberalization and the political system becomes more democratic. The political system becomes more democratic as the political environment shifts in the direction of political liberalization and the political system becomes more democratic.

George W. and Cynthia Adams of Portland, Maine, worked in the Vietnam area for the CIA, made plans in 1970 to meet in Saigon, married in 1971, and returned to the United States. Adams says she and her husband "never had any official communications with the CIA after we came back."

Others were plans conceived at the government's instigation and carried out in 1922. Amongst these plans, the "plan of universal education" was the plan of extending education and raising the general standard of the whole of the people's culture. In the plan of universal education, the government planned to raise the level of the people's culture by 1924 in the amount of

[illegible][illegible]

1. The first step in the process of the investigation is the identification of the problem. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

2. The second step in the process is the design of the study. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

3. The third step in the process is the collection of data. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

4. The fourth step in the process is the analysis of the data. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

5. The fifth step in the process is the interpretation of the results. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

6. The sixth step in the process is the presentation of the results. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

7. The seventh step in the process is the conclusion. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

8. The eighth step in the process is the evaluation of the study. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

9. The ninth step in the process is the dissemination of the results. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

10. The tenth step in the process is the final report. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the study. The investigator must also determine the objectives of the study and the methods to be used.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, County of San Diego, do hereby certify that the following is a true and correct copy of the Ordinance of the Board of Supervisors of said County, as the same appears from the records of said Board, to-wit:

American intelligence. In the fall of 1960, discovered by Fidel and facing possible execution, he escaped.

After contacting the CIA to tell them all he knew about Castro's operations, Hemming settled in Florida. There he started Interpen, a specialized group that trained embittered Cuban exiles in special Florida camps for long-range penetration and guerrilla warfare against Castro's regime. He maintained a cadre of twenty-five instructors. And he began a long friendly-adversary relationship with the CIA, the Mob, the Hughes interests, Congress, and many wealthy and influential Americans.

For the last ten years, since Interpen disbanded in 1964, Henning has worked for a NASA project in Africa; as a paid investigator on Jim Garrison's staff looking into the Kennedy assassination; and as part of a paramedic team that rescued survivors in the 1970 Peruvian earthquake.

Gerry Hemming was around for the tumult and the shouting, the hits and the misses. He was an insider who knew most of the secrets and the locations of the skeletons in the closet. Concerned that America may be drifting perilously close to a Gestapo-type state of mind, he has decided to talk.

ARGOSY: You've told Senate investigators that 1963 marked a startling change in your liaisons with certain groups and certain wealthy American citizens. And this change finally led to the dissolution of your group, the International Penetration Force. Could you elaborate on what happened then?

HEMINGWAY: There were a helluva lot of weird things going on. We'd begun to encounter more and more organizations of people in different cities with one thing on their mind—initially, taking care of Castro and then doing something about the other “problem,” that “guy” in the White House. You couldn’t walk down the street without running into some kind of conspiracy. I don’t doubt that there are a dozen people out there that are sure they

By Dick Russell

are the ones who financed the Dallas job on Kennedy.

ARGOSY: Were offers to assassinate Kennedy actually made to you and your group?

HEMMING: Rather frequently.

ARGOSY: How many?

HEMMING: More than two dozen, by organized elements that had financial backing within the United States.

ARGOSY: What kind of elements? The right wing? Minutemen types?

HEMMING: There might be a retired armed forces type, a guy from the Klan. These would only be casual conversations. When it came time to open up the attaché case with the money in it, it was usually a mixed group.

ARGOSY: You actually saw money on the line?

HEMMING: Oh yeah, more than once. Some of the cheapos talked about \$100,000; one said they'd pay a million.

ARGOSY: So what did you do?

HEMMING: About that point, we would gracefully back out of it. Then we would later find out that they were trying to recruit our Cuban contacts for the same purpose.

ARGOSY: Do you think it's possible that the Kennedy killing involved some of the Cuban exile community?

HEMMING: Yes, very possible. It wasn't that hard a job. I've seen and been on the scene for harder jobs than what happened in Dealey Plaza. You had a hard core of characters in the Dallas Police and County Sheriff's Department that would blow somebody's head off at a whisper. When you've got people running around who have friendships with organized crime, Federal agencies, and have been in bed with so many people—well, when the assassination goes down, everybody's covering their tracks.

ARGOSY: Can you be specific about the offers you received to kill Kennedy?

HEMMING: Look, there are people who didn't have a goddamn thing to do with it, but they *think* they did because they were conned by other people. If they think somebody's gonna point the finger at them, they're gonna get 'em. And I'd like to stay alive.

ARGOSY: You told the Senate investigators that you believed in 1963 that Loran [Lorenzo] Hall was somehow involved. [Hall, an ex-CIA contract employee, right-wing politico and trainer of Cuban exiles for a Cuban invasion, was named by the Warren Commission as one of three men who may have been in Dallas with Lee Harvey Oswald in September 1963.]

HEMMING: Yes, the day of the assassination, I made a call to Texas from Miami. And I pointedly asked, is Lorenzo Hall in Dallas? I made the call about 1:30 or 2:00 in the afternoon. He was there. My contact had seen him in Dallas the day before.

ARGOSY: Why were you suspicious of Lorenzo Hall?

HEMMING: Because he left Miami with the stated intent to get Kennedy. And he had my weapon, a Johnson 30.06 break-down rifle with a scope on it that had been

prepared for the Bay of Pigs. I'd left it with a private investigator who had previously worked under Agency [CIA] auspices on the West Coast. Hall got the weapon when we ran short of funds on a return trip from L.A. to Florida, and we ended up using Hall's car.

ARGOSY: You were working closely with Hall?

HEMMING: He came out to work with our group in 1963. Then he ran afoul with some people, and immediately went to work with a group that I thought was infiltrated by Castro's agents. Hall ignored this. He siphoned off a couple of people who had worked with me in the past, and started organizing his own operation with [Frank] Sturgis and some other guys.

ARGOSY: Hall left Miami again shortly before the assassination? Could you be more specific about his plans?

HEMMING: He was gonna stop and look up a number of people. Some he'd met through me, others when he was in Cuba in 1959. One was Santo Trafficante's brother in St. Pete, and some others who operated under Meyer Lansky's auspices. [Lansky is the boss of the National Crime Syndicate.] And there were still other connections in Louisiana and Texas that had expressed an interest.

ARGOSY: In eliminating Kennedy?

HEMMING: Yes.

ARGOSY: And you believe Hall was directly involved...?

HEMMING: He knew how to do the job. We'd discussed various techniques as part of our schooling—techniques required for Havana, Port-au-Prince and other Latin American jobs. But I think somebody was trying to put him there [Dallas] so he'd be one of the patsies.

ARGOSY: You've said you believe Oswald was a patsy. Did you ever have contact with Oswald?

HEMMING: I ran into Oswald in Los Angeles in 1959, when he showed up at the Cuban Consulate. The coordinator of the 26th of July Movement [a Cuban organization] called me aside and said a Marine officer had showed up, intimating that he was prepared to desert and go to Cuba to become a revolutionary. I met with the Marine and he told me he was a noncommissioned officer. He talked about being a radar operator and helping the Cubans out with everything he knew. He turned out to be Oswald.

ARGOSY: What was your impression of him? Was he sincere?

HEMMING: I thought he was a penetrator [of pro-Castro forces]. I told the 26th of July leadership to get rid of him. I thought he was on the Naval Intelligence payroll at the time.

ARGOSY: What about Jack Ruby? Did you know of him? Supposedly he'd been involved in Cuban gunrunning and smuggling operations....

HEMMING: From what I understand, Ruby was around way back in 1947 when Claude Adderley—the Hiroshima pilot—got involved in a plan to bomb Havana. He also had a connection to an intelligence-Mob type in Mexico who was running the operation. They all got hauled into Federal court, arms and equipment were confiscated, and someone told me that Ruby had some kind of involvement. And you can figure Ruby was acquainted with some of the people involved in the Kennedy operation in Shreveport, New

Orleans, and Texas. He worked with the Chicago mob and some Pittsburgh boys, and was in good with the Lansky people down in Havana.

ARGOSY: So you see a definite role for organized crime in the picture?

HEMMING: Look, going back to things concerning the overthrow of Batista in 1958, the Mob was trying to get their boys into Cuba—Sturgis, Johnny Devereux, Jack Cannon, Herman Marx. They wanted people on both sides [with Batista and with Castro]. Later they operated the same way, trying to do the hits against Fidel through 1959 and 1960.

ARGOSY: The Mob was actually pulling those kinds of things in Cuba before the CIA's attempts on Castro's life?

HEMMING: Well, let's say they all know one another. They get along. Quite a few of the people who had worked for the Agency and had gotten into a little trouble, went to work for people that knew Mob people or [Howard] Hughes people. Everybody gets to know everybody else. And Castro was getting tired of the attempts on his life. And finally I think some of Fidel's boys had people in Mexico monitoring the JFK thing in 1963. Their presence was indicated.

ARGOSY: You mean that Castro might also have been involved in the Kennedy assassination?

HEMMING: Consider that Castro was faced with all these CIA-Mob hits; a lot of people were coming down on him. At a lower echelon, people in his own circle, wanting to do the "big guy" a favor, might've taken things into their own hands. I don't see Castro himself directing the thing. It could've been like Jeb Magruder and Gordon Liddy in Watergate—you know, "we've got to get rid of this Jack Anderson," so away Liddy goes with a grenade in his hand. The thing is, you had so many people planning the Kennedy thing, it was bound to come.

ARGOSY: Could one motivation have been to try to pin the blame on Castro in order to justify an immediate invasion of Cuba?

HEMMING: There are people crazy enough to think that that would be the outcome. If there had been enough fingers pointed in Castro's direction, Lyndon Johnson might've struck out at Havana in the belief that it was a KGB [Russian intelligence]-Castro operation.

ARGOSY: Last year, you told Senate investigators about a similar situation in 1970 when you discussed a plot by some anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami—who worked closely with the CIA—to fire a missile at Richard Nixon's Florida presidential compound and make it look like a Castro-planned operation. Could you tell us what that was all about?

HEMMING: That was in the fall of 1970. Let me give you a little background. This particular group of exiles was working on a commodities exchange operation out of Florida. There's a tremendous shortage of commodities inside Cuba—coffee, flour, you name it. So the original intent was to compromise some of Castro's Cuban army types by getting them a few goodies now and then. There were a number of fishing boats moving out from Florida and taking commodities down there—primarily ice, lard, used clothing, used shoes, and things like that.

One thing led to another, and one of

the exile groups got absorbed by the CIA. The CIA started using this operation for getting agents in and out of Cuba. In many cases they were even going inside small Cuban ports, escorted by Castro's PT boats. They'd make their trades and pick up lobster. They could insert agents into Cuba that way as long as they didn't harm that particular territory. They got a tremendous amount of cooperation in the ports, so long as they weren't going in for a commando operation, because everybody was making a lot of money on this commodities racket.

About this time, one of my contacts got into the thing. And before long, this group starts talking in Miami about having the full cooperation of some Castro military types who were about to be issued a Russian Ossa patrol vessel, the kind that carries the Styx missiles. They said they also had contacts with some SAM [Strategic Air Missile] site people inside Cuba with Castro's Air Force artillery. And the exiles were going to use those people by putting together a simultaneous plan. First, one of the SAMs would "accidentally" hit one of the aircraft heading into the U.S. base at Guantanamo and at the same time, the presidential compound on Bay Lige in Key Biscayne would get hit with a couple of Styx missiles.

Their patrol boat would innocently be three or four miles out to sea—very easily identifiable with Cuban markings. They were gonna make sure to hit the compound when Nixon was in town. Maybe they'd wait until he stepped out in his helicopter. I don't know what the coordination was. I didn't get that close to it. But my impression was that there wouldn't be any survivors in the presidential compound.

ARGOSY: And these exiles were working for the CIA?

HEMMING: Yes, they were monitored by the CIA.

ARGOSY: Was it specifically an assassination plot against Nixon?

HEMMING: It could have turned into one. The people involved knew they were risking that among the fatalities could be Richard M. Nixon. There wasn't any personal animosity against Nixon. But it didn't bother them in the least if it had to go that way. It was designed as a provocation. And what do you think Spiro Agnew would have done about six hours later, thinking it was a Castro operation?

ARGOSY: So the plan was immediate retaliation against Cuba by the U.S. government....

HEMMING: This was the group's thinking. They planned to have some "loyal" Castro types on board in the patrol boat, the ones they'd contacted through the commodities operation, and then the planners behind the *real* operation would leave the boat. I imagine they were gonna do something to the boat, or allow something to be done. Then they were gonna get all their people out of Florida. They'd already acquired two aircraft for that purpose. And they were spending money.

I hesitate to say who knew about it or approved it. But the thing was ongoing, and being monitored by the CIA.

ARGOSY: What happened to stop it?

HEMMING: Through my contact in the group, they approached me to get them a

pilot and backup aircraft to get them the hell out of Florida when the operation went down. So I took a little trip with my contact to see the local Secret Service and we told 'em the story. There was a big flap about it, involving the Army and Navy and everybody. But the CIA or Customs—or maybe both—put together a "personality memo" knocking me, and gave it to the Secret Service. Then a call comes from the Washington Secret Service, telling Joseph Gasquez of their Miami bureau that the Army and Navy are on their ass. The guy wanted Gasquez to quit meddling around. Gasquez says, "These people are plotting to kill the President of the United States! They've got the weapons and the capability!" And Washington says, "Drop it." Gasquez had brought in some people to set up an illegal buy of automatic weapons and explosives by the conspirators, so there'd be an excuse to arrest them.

About ten days went by. Then Gasquez gets a hold of me and says, "Don't worry, the CIA says they have it wired in." Well, of course they had it wired in—the guy leading the exile group had been in touch with the CIA continuously. But now the CIA wanted my contact out of the picture. I didn't go along with it. A few days later, a Customs and an FBI agent approached the group where they had anchored a fishing boat off the Flagler Street Bridge in Miami. The FBI said pointedly, "We have information that you're smuggling automatic weapons," and glanced over at my man standing a few feet away. They were trying to burn him, get him killed as an informer.

Anyway, the missile operation was blown. Whatever they were planning, they couldn't do it after all this. I doubt if they actually could've gotten an Ossa boat or Styx missiles. If anything, they'd probably have been able to bring in a P-4 boat with a 3720-mm cannon on it. But this wasn't the end of it. About three days after the FBI tried to burn my contact, he told me what happened when Bebe Rebozo's houseboat started coming up the Miami River with the president on board.

ARGOSY: What was that?

HEMMING: First of all, the Secret Service had been told by the CIA to stop any surveillance on the exiles' fishing boat. The Agency said they had everything under control, and that what I'd said [about the "accidental" missile attack] was all bullshit. So the Secret Service, instead of standing on that goddamn exile boat whenever Nixon decided to take a cruise, pulled back. Nobody'd taken any precautions.

So here comes the president up the river [on Rebozo's boat], passing right by this boat full of exiles. There was an exchange of greetings in Spanish, and the *Coco Lobo* [Rebozo's boat] pulled over so they could all shake hands! Those Cubans were drunk and there were automatic carbines lying on the bunks within six feet of the president. All you needed was one guy who wasn't in on the whole plan to say, "Okay, here I go," [take gun in hand] and spray the houseboat. There were Secret Servicemen on board the houseboat, of course, but no deeper surveillance.

ARGOSY: But no incident occurred?

HEMMING: No. They exchanged greetings and the boats continued on up the

river. It was ironic that they'd come together at this point. I don't know that Nixon was in any real danger, but the potential was there. When I told Gasquez of the Secret Service about this, he nearly hemorrhaged.

ARGOSY: What happened to the exile group?

HEMMING: They're still in business. They shifted over to Chilean operations. This same group set up hits in 1971 against Fidel in Antofagasta and Santiago, Chile, also in Lima, Peru. The attempt was heavily financed and might have involved Howard Hunt and some other people. In Chile, I know a guy who carried a camera with a built-in gun, but he chickened out about six feet away from Fidel at the last minute. In Lima, they had an aircraft waiting with a large 20-mm cannon in the door, waiting for Fidel to fly in. But Castro's plane pulled in with the door on the wrong side, and the American piloting the "hit" plane wouldn't move it down to a spot from which they could take a shot. They were going to try something in Bogota after that, with a pilot trying to knock down Castro's plane, but something else went wrong.

ARGOSY: Was the incident in Key Biscayne unusual? Surely it wasn't the kind of thing that happened regularly?

HEMMING: It was just one page in a big book. I think there was quite a package prepared.

ARGOSY: But by whom?

HEMMING: Who the hell could it be? You've got enough factions, it could be anybody. Everybody's had their little private CIAs for years—organized crime people, Hughes people, not to mention Nixon's own little government within a government.

ARGOSY: You told the Senate another bizarre story about Frank Sturgis trying to work out some kind of deal to obtain automatic weapons to disrupt the 1972 Republican and Democratic Presidential conventions.

HEMMING: This started when a former associate of mine and I got together with some other people in the firearms business, people who were legally manufacturing automatic weapons with silencers, under government license in Georgia. We set up a Miami corporation called Parabellum, licensed for demonstrations and sales to the Latin American market. By early 1972, we were also talking with law-enforcement agencies about their acquiring some SWAT-type weapons, counterterror equipment, through our firm. A little bit prior to this, I'd been called by a local FBI agent who had asked me to do a favor for a friend of Sturgis. This aroused my curiosity somewhat. The next thing I hear is that Sturgis is running around to law-enforcement people giving them the same exact [sales] spiel I was! I figured, at first, that he was trying to cut into our market or something. He was fumbling around with chiefs of police in little Florida towns, making promises to get them automatic weapons in return for getting a bunch of his people IDed as law enforcement people—reserve officers, deputies—so they could carry the same weapons. Then I picked up on a couple of right-wing types talking about how they had a lot of automatic weapons, and when the political conventions came down to Miami... well, this started smelling a lit-

tle bit funny.

I had no idea at this time that Sturgis was working the Watergate Plumber thing. I did some checking with Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and told them Sturgis wasn't working for us, and wasn't licensed to sell firearms or mention our particular brand name. Then I got the word that I'd spoiled something, stepped on somebody's toes. What I'd done got back to the Plumbers, apparently, and some people started using influence from Nixon's White House and the State Department to cancel our export licenses. They put us out of business.

ARGOSY: But what was Sturgis going to do with this scheme? Were there actually plans in the works to disrupt the Miami conventions in 1972?

HEMMING: It's hard to pinpoint Sturgis. Who knows whether he knew what was going on? But, yeah, there were plans for the convention. I talked to some of the people participating in it, who later participated in the Watergate thing.

ARGOSY: What were they planning?

HEMMING: Create a shoot-out, using the Yippies and Zippies and the other "hard-core Commies" they were so worried about. The people I spoke to were gonna put some of this equipment in their hands, and some in law-enforcement hands, and use some of the local vigilantes to start the shoot-out. This would finally straighten out Washington as to where the priorities were on overcoming the "domestic Communist menace."

ARGOSY: What stopped it from happening?

HEMMING: I think some other people created enough heat to prevent the equipment from falling into those hands. I think [James] McCord was one who did something about it. I've been told [J. Edgar] Hoover and certain Agency people were upset that certain other people were trying to create a private Gestapo in the U.S. So they penetrated it, and took measures to stop it. My blessings are with them.

ARGOSY: What seems so incredible is that so many groups with connections to the highest levels of government are able to go off on tangents and plan terrible deeds—right under the noses of the White House, the CIA, the FBI, and often seemingly with their blessing. Or at least with the blessing of a faction inside those government agencies. Can you cite any other examples of this kind of activity?

HEMMING: Well, you've got the real estate fraud involving Bell Mortgage. I've been working as an investigator for the attorney who filed Bell's suit against the CIA. It's a very complicated, very involved situation. It starts with Watergate, when you had a lot of CIA Cuban and American contract operatives coming under some pressure from [James] Schlesinger, who had taken over in the Agency. He'd started cleaning house, people were being fired left and right on short notice, and operations were being shut down. Then [William] Colby took over. He wanted summaries of everything that was happening.

Now a helluva lot of [CIA] contract employees working Latin America were also working for other Federal agencies, such as Internal Revenue and Drug Enforcement [DEA]. People like this start under CIA retainer, but the CIA budget can't afford them full-time, so they get

traded around. Then, when Watergate started crumbling and everybody was pulling in their horns, these contract guys panicked and started setting up some new proprietary companies to fund Latin American operations. They might've looked for financial support through narcotics, too. But primarily, the proprietaries could supply enough funding to keep things going and buried from the scrutiny on Schlesinger and Colby until things quieted down. One of these was Bell Mortgage.

Andres Castro developed Bell Mortgage in 1969. He was very successful. Then he was asked if he'd be interested in talking to a couple of these local contract people because, they said, the CIA was looking for patriotic citizens to help as fronts for laundering money and financing operations. They told him a lot of banks were running scared because of Watergate, so [CIA] funds were frozen in certain banks in Florida and other places. See, at the same time here in Miami, there were other big businessmen who'd gotten big through "dirty" money and who were under scrutiny by the IRS. They were being approached by these same Agency employees, who said they had friends in IRS and could get the heat off in exchange for a small donation to the Watergate Defense Fund. A lot of businessmen started playing ball.

Then, Andres Castro [of Bell Mortgage] meets with these CIA people. They explain how he can double up on mortgages and inflate the values on properties while at the same time passing some cash along to the CIA.

As time goes on, Andres is given some training in crypto-communications. They put a hot-line in his office, a phone in his car. They ask him to buy a more expensive, faster aircraft—to fly wounded personnel out of Central America to Bethesda Naval Hospital. Then they fly him down to Nicaragua, where he meets with President Somoza, the CIA chief of station, and Somoza's CIA-supplied bodyguard. Somoza confirms that the mortgage money is to be used to finance a "Company" [CIA] operation involving Chile, Panama and Costa Rica—specifically, it was for getting rid of [Salvador] Allende in Chile and Torrijos in Panama. [Allende was killed in the Chilean coup of September 1973.] Andres is told to start replacing his employees at Bell Mortgage, one by one, with CIA employees. He winds up having to deliver \$100,000 and then \$900,000 to two CIA contacts in Florida, through a guy named Guillermo Yglesias. Andres finally went to the CIA in Langley and told them what was going on. But the CIA had already been officially informed—and did absolutely nothing about it. Somebody with a law background would call that "misprision of a felony." But the CIA couldn't touch Guillermo Yglesias, because he had something on them. He had been in on an operation in 1964 when some Spanish seamen were murdered.

ARGOSY: What operation was that?
HEMMING: The CIA was using a group of Cuban exile naval commandos, affiliated with [Manuel] Artime and based primarily out of the Dominican Republic. Many of the participants were listed as Dominican Navy or Air Force officers, so if somebody ever nailed them in a big con-

gressional investigation, they had their cover established. In 1964, one of the operations was to intercept and sink a Castro cargo vessel called the *Sierra Maestra*. They'd had surveillance on it when it left either a Finnish or Russian port, and they had an ambush set up to get it as it approached the Bahamas. But the boats that were set up for the intercept were being hampered by bad visibility. They saw this ship coming out of the fog, and the commander could make out the word *Sierra*, so they fired. They killed the captain and half the crew, and burned the hell out of the ship. And it was a *Spanish* ship—the *Sierra Aranzazu*. All commando operations were cancelled the next day. It was all published in the press—except for who did the job. Our government denied knowing a goddamn thing about it. Well, there are murder warrants waiting in Spain for the CIA right now. Any of these people—Captain Mateo, Second Officer Remigio Arce, Engineering Officer Guillermo Yglesias—could all be hauled to Spain tomorrow and garroted for murder on the high seas. Some Americans would get hung, too.

ARGOSY: Were you ever personally involved in anything like this?

HEMMING: Oh, in 1961, some Mob people wanted my group to do a couple of jobs up in Canada. There was a ship that was supposed to go out through the St. Lawrence Seaway, carrying spare parts and aviation machinery to Cuba. They wanted us to hit it. Later, instead of doing that, they wanted us to beach it somewhere in South Carolina. We kind of frowned on that, because people call it piracy. It would not have been in our best interest to do some of the things they were promoting.

And I was aware of a couple of the attempts on Fidel. We [Interpen] felt Castro was so clumsy that leaving him in power suited our purpose more than allowing Raul [Castro] or Che [Guevara] or some of the more hard-core Communists to take control. Even the KGB [Russian Intelligence] attempted a coup against Fidel in '63 because they wanted the Party and not some wild-eyed guerrilla operation in control.

ARGOSY: Who was paying your way back then?

HEMMING: There were dribs and drabs from people connected with organized crime, some from the right wing, and even some from quite liberal sources. An ex-dictator from Colombia sent us a monthly stipend because he envisioned someday using our [Interpen's] talents for his benefit. The same thing happened with an ex-dictator from Venezuela. Our job was mostly to introduce some Cuban exiles to people who had money, and also to show these exiles how to stay away from the suicide operations that other groups wanted 'em to do.

ARGOSY: You mentioned earlier that Howard Hughes' organization had its own operation in Florida that concentrated on Cuba. Can you go into more detail on that operation?

HEMMING: Getting research on the Hughes operation is well nigh impossible, but it was a sizeable organization. One Cuban exile organization was on a Hughes retainer handled by C. Osment Moody, who's now, I think, southeastern director

for one of Hughes' larger insurance outfits located in Miami. The guy's a millionaire himself.

ARGOSY: Do you know of any attempts to assassinate Castro that emanated from this Hughes network?

HEMMING: More than one. The group Moody had on retainer inserted numerous teams into Cuba, trying to do hits, and a helluva lot of people got killed. In 1961, eighty-eight of their people were executed by Fidel. Then I know of a job they were gonna do on Fidel in Miramar, Cuba, in 1964. There was a bad scene in Key West when one of the boats blew up and a guy got killed.

For another hit, Sturgis' buddy Diaz Lanz was brought in to do the job, and he left for Cuba from Cay Sal. Cay Sal is technically part of the Bahamas, but the Hughes Tool Company has a ninety-nine-year lease on it. From Key West, Osment Moody oversees it and a Bahamian named Robinson is stationed there. If strangers came on, he'd radio to Moody. You didn't go near Cay Sal unless it was cleared, either through Moody or the Agency. It was really a launching area place to run to when people have a rough time getting out. Of course, others who wanted to get out just went to an intelligence ship—a *Pueblo*-type vessel called U.S.S. *Oxford*—that moved up and down the coast.

ARGOSY: Did you know Robert Maheu, the Hughes man who served as the liaison between the CIA and the Mob on some of the other attempts on Castro? Or John Roselli, the Mob guy who was one of Maheu's contacts?

HEMMING: Names like Maheu didn't come up. John Roselli I knew—but I didn't know who he was. He was using the name Phil. These are guys who don't use their last names.

ARGOSY: Was the Hughes-CIA-Mob link around Cuba a wedding or a rivalry?

HEMMING: Convenience. You're not talking about Hughes himself on a lot of these things. But the interest of some lower- or middle-echelon Hughes people was to provoke situations and lobby where they could. There were things they could all make a buck on. It's hard to say what kind of operations, though.

ARGOSY: Anything else you can tell us about anti-Castro operations back then?

HEMMING: Well, if you want to get into the Senate's foreign assassinations report, the "B-1" that they mention as a CIA contact to assassinate Fidel is Manuel Artime. [Artime, a close friend of Howard Hunt, was among the exile leaders in the planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion]. And "AM/LASH," the guy the CIA gave the poisons to for administering to Fidel, is Rolando Cubela. He's under house arrest in Cuba now. Hunt was in on that, too. Desmond Fitzgerald [CIA Western Hemisphere chief] and some of his boys were running the "Z-R Rifle" Castro assassination operation the Senate talks about in its report.

ARGOSY: What about the tracking down of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967? Was that a CIA operation?

HEMMING: The team was under Major Shelton, a Special Forces commander in Panama. They got the okay from the Joint Chiefs to do the operation on Che. Once they'd determined that Che was giving Cuban-type guerrilla training in Bolivia,

they took two teams down to Santa Cruz del Sur to train anti-Che Bolivian rangers. This took about four months. Then they went on the hunt, using special C-130 aircraft—including U-2 overflights and infrared photography—to locate Che people. They finally nailed him. [Alonzo] Gonzalez and a guy called Ramirez did the job on Che. [Gonzalez, a Cuban, was educated in the U.S., and worked for the Office of Naval Intelligence in Guantanamo.]

All this was a kind of Operation Phoenix [the CIA's Vietnam terror and assassination campaign] for Latin America. There's a guy in Miami who worked on this more than once. Evidently he's now had a falling out with some Cubans involved in narcotics. He's a close friend of Bebe Rebozo, and Rebozo's interested in protecting him.

ARGOSY: What kind of role does Nixon's friend Rebozo play in all this?

HEMMING: He's no more than a bagman. He was the guy who had prime responsibility for sifting through all the plots, schemes and connections—to find the ones that would best benefit "tricky Dick." Some of the local Cuban exiles penetrated the Nixon circle and were guests at the presidential compound. The Secret Service logs would show that—if you could find them.

ARGOSY: This connection between people in government and Cuban exiles or other Latin American operatives is amazing. Can you think of anything else along those lines?

HEMMING: The Trujillo thing in the Dominican Republic, back in '61 and before that. There was an American, an ex-Marine, who worked for Arturo Espallat, Trujillo's chief of intelligence. He got involved in some of the Trujillo operations—the Galindez kidnapping, an attempted assassination of [Romulo] Betancourt of Venezuela, and some anti-Castro and anti-Haiti things. All through this, Trujillo was kicking some money in the right direction—to Congressman Cooley, Senator [George] Smathers, and some others. A whole gang of congressmen got real friendly with those people. And this American ex-Marine was the bagman; he could get entrée to those people. He did all the English publications that Trujillo sent up to congressmen and wrote pro-Trujillo articles for the *Indianapolis Star*, which Trujillo also kicked money into. But he knew it was only a matter of time before Trujillo's end. [The CIA helped ensure Trujillo's assassination in 1961.] Espallat knew the whole scheme, and suggested to his American aide that it looked like Washington was gonna "go all the way,"

so why not just watch what happened? Espallat tried to take over after the hit went down. He died in an accident in Lisbon a few years ago. His American friend went to work for a private CIA operation in Baltimore called International Services of Information.

ARGOSY: When you talked to the Senate, you also mentioned a remarkable situation around a former Florida governor named Ferris Bryant.

HEMMING: Yes, he was governor before Claude Kirk. Well, by early 1962 we'd [Interpen] established a very good relationship with some very influential

people in the United States. It had taken a lot of hard work, a helluva lot of talking and convincing. And some of this led us to Governor Bryant's staff. He, along with Senator [Kenneth] Keating and some others, were recipients of raw intelligence about Cuba, prior to the missile crisis. And he was concerned about the possibility of Florida suffering the first damage in any encounter. During the Southeastern Governor's Conference in September 1962, he'd planned to bring some of the governors into our exile training camps, go public and say he was organizing a state militia to train American and Cuban exile volunteers, in case of any threat from Cuba. This was based on an old law instituted when Florida came into the union, which said that the state could have foreign dealings and its own small state department to conduct preventive warfare against the Indians. About this time, James Meredith unexpectedly walked into the University of Mississippi [creating a civil rights crisis] and this broke up the governor's conference. The Kennedy people moved in fast to get a hold of Bryant and brief him [tell him to keep quiet] about the imminent missile crisis. Afterwards, the Kennedy people got him to Washington, D.C. as Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. This gave him a seat on the National Security Council, a place where you can brief somebody to death. They put him "on the team."

ARGOSY: Then there was considerable advance warning on the missile crisis?

HEMMING: My group had started getting information from Cuba indicating tighter security activity, more than just anti-aircraft missile defense operations, and enlargement of Russian facilities. These later were identified to be the SAM sites and mobile medium-range ballistic missiles. But as far as we were concerned, the missiles were never delivered to the island. Preparations were made, but our information indicated there never was a missile in Cuba. Kennedy was scammed. He was so suspicious of the CIA's photo-interpreters that he insisted that the Defense People take over. [CIA Director John] McCone was away on his honeymoon, and then his son-in-law got into a strange accident [keeping him away longer]. All kinds of things were going on while somebody was trying to provoke a confrontation between Cuba and the U.S. We were more than willing to go along with that—the night Kennedy went on TV, we'd launched a boat on an operation from Marathon Key to Havana province—but the crisis wasn't real. You look at who benefited from such things and you could see how they'd be engineered. I think Kennedy found out towards the end, and that's why things developed as they did.

ARGOSY: It seems we're getting back to the Kennedy assassination. One final thing that's surfaced in recent weeks—the Exner woman who had relationships with both Kennedy and Mobsters Sam Giancana and John Roselli.

HEMMING: Yes, this was the Mob penetrating the White House. When you talk about the Mob, you're not talking about a homogeneous unit. The only homogeneous part is Lansky's, but the Mob is mostly feudal warlords in major cities. Quite a few have developed their own CIAs. This is right in line with their

penetration of law-enforcement agencies, which gives them access to things like judges and FBI documents. They've learned how to wire tap the FBI just like the FBI wire taps them. Their program has always been, naturally, to penetrate at the highest level. And they did. They did it very well. There were Cubans up in the White House, too—select Cubans kept on government retainers, who knew everything going on and at some point made Mob connections. Some stayed at Bobby Kennedy's house, and one dated Jackie's social secretary. They have since gravitated to good political positions in the U.S. and elsewhere. They became part of the political family up there. We [Interpen] monitored them, and used them like the Mob used them.

ARGOSY: Do you mind our asking how you came to possess all this information?

HEMMING: It's a very small world in this business. We're all the same people. You don't go outside a circle, you know? If you're involved in arms supply or whatever, it's always the same contacts. We had guys constantly working with us until they were picked up by the CIA. Then when the CIA dropped them, they'd come back to us. These Cubans' prime belief was that we were the good CIA guys. To stay in good with us, they'd even check with us prior to operations. So here I was, sitting in the street with people pouring in and out with all kinds of confidential information.

ARGOSY: Why have you decided to talk about it now?

HEMMING: These last ten years have been a tremendous education. South of the border you learn a lot of things you're not taught in school, and you can get past the propaganda if you know how to read it. I learned from one of my early contacts in intelligence—a gentleman who later killed himself—that if I wanted to stay alive, I had better never pass on anything that could be attributed to me. I should be an anonymous phone caller. If I didn't cover my tracks, he told me, I would soak up some lead. Since that time, I have basically just stuck my nose into things to find out if other people knew about them. I'd later find [using this method] that some who were supposed to know *didn't*, and others did, but did nothing about it. In my younger years, I felt they knew better than me, so I'd just keep my mouth shut. Now that the years have gone by, I find out why things happened in a certain way.

ARGOSY: Are there others like yourself who'd now be willing to go public?

HEMMING: There are some people who are a little perturbed. They saw how the Cuban situation was used for personal gain by Nixon people, CIA people and everybody else. For a long time, they believed this was one country that wasn't like Latin America, where everybody's on the take. The Watergate thing really burned 'em. They're feeling low about it. And they've got a pretty clear picture of things. They know they were used.

ARGOSY: Any final thoughts on the state of the union?

HEMMING: I can still see the need for covert operations. But I can't see FBI, CIA or other government employees breaking the law. That's right around the corner from Gestapo. If guys can go out and murder while they're carrying govern-

ment IDs, what are they gonna do next week? You always need that "snoopin' and poopin'," that's what the Agency was designed for. But keep covert operations separate. Go hire the goddamn mercenaries and let them do the dirty work. Then you're not involving the flag, and you don't have government men running dope and doing hits on the side for money.

Look, every time you turn around, the CIA is supporting one side or the other, or mucking around diplomatically, trying to screw things up. And all the foul-ups they had would never have occurred if they'd kept their fingers out. Allende didn't have a chance in Chile until they started fighting him. Just supporting the right-wing and giving them more than they had coming, gave more support to Allende. If they'd stayed out, nature would have taken its course. Some disgruntled Chilean would've blown his head off. Or he would have turned into a Tito or something. Now it comes back on us.

They're always so worried about some guy going Commie. To this day, Castro is not a Communist. He isn't about to take orders from somebody. He isn't stupid enough to follow anybody else's doctrine. He's gonna listen to some Muscovite jerk that's never been out in the [Cuban] bush? Bullshit!

Yeah, all these people that are so worried about conspiracies... They're creating the conspiracies. □

REPUBLIC, Phoenix
9 March 1976

Playing by two rules

Sen. Frank Church's exposure of Central Intelligence Agency activities has focused, at one time or another, on the probity of CIA using journalists and missionaries as contacts overseas.

Recent news items should be of interest to Sen. Church.

A new Soviet "diplomat" being assigned to the United States is Ivan Udaltsov, 57, former head of the Russian press agency, Novosti. In a 1974 book on the inner-workings of the KGB, author John Barron identified Udaltsov as a Russian KGB agent who helped with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Elsewhere in the news, Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Nikodim of the World Council of Churches has been linked repeatedly to the KGB by Soviet defectors.

So much for what's right for us, and what's right for them.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
19 MARCH 1976

Bob Wiedrich

Spy probe 'secret' is failure of CIA

THE AMERICAN intelligence community is dangerously weak and has failed in the job of protecting national security.

That is the real secret contained in the House Intelligence Committee report that Congress voted to keep bottled up under administration pressure, not the shocking tales of isolated assassination plots and deadly shellfish toxin that sidetracked the media from the more important long range story.

The hair raising stuff grabbed public attention. It made good reading.

And the material for those headlines was selectively leaked or disclosed by Capitol Hill politicians and executive branch functionaries who either sought personal publicity or had reason to divert attention from the real conclusions of the House Committee report.

But were the full document to be published today, the thoughtful reader assessing its contents would be appalled by the basic thrust of the report.

For it lays bare, with supporting evidence, an outrageous tale of repeated failure, intramural and interagency bickering, and political interference that raises questions about how we spend an estimated \$10 billion annually on intelligence gathering and analysis.

AMONG OTHER things, the report charges that:

- American intelligence completely lost track of major Russian army units moving through eastern Europe for two weeks prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

- Intelligence evaluation techniques failed miserably in predicting the Communist Tet offensive in South Viet Nam in January, 1968.

- Our espionage services blew it totally in interpreting certain tell-tale signs that would have enabled the United States to warn Israel of an impending Egyptian attack in October, 1973.

- The same kind of bureaucratic bungling botched the intelligence job concerning events leading to the coup against Archbishop Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

In the case of the Tet offensive, it was the politicians who intruded. The CIA judged its information correctly, that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were marshaling their forces for the first time in conventional lines of battle and had the capability of launching a major offensive.

Military intelligence insisted on downgrading the Communist effort as a guerrilla force without such capability.

And the Johnson administration accepted the military intelligence assessment in line with a political decision designed to fail the American people into still believing they were only en-

gaged in a limited war in Southeast Asia.

IN FACT, American military academicians are now teaching the nation's future armed forces leaders that the Tet offensive was the worst surprise attack sustained by U.S. fighting men since Pearl Harbor and that it was a defeat of intelligence operations.

In essence, the report charges that we are not getting the proper analysis of intelligence information in some instances or the information is not getting to the right people in time to do something about it. Even worse, there are indications some of the vital intelligence has been ignored in high places or political decisions have intruded on realistic appraisal of the facts.

Rep. Otis Pike [D., N.Y.], chairman of the now defunct Intelligence Committee, told the Congress last week that in each event weighed by the panel, the question was asked:

"What was our intelligence telling us about the likelihood of these major events before they happened?"

THEN LATER he concluded: "The basic thrust of our report is that despite the billions of dollars we expended on it, despite the genius of the scientists who work in our intelligence community and the occasional bravery of the men working within our intelligence community, despite its occasional small successes, in every single instance in which we compared what our intelligence community was predicting with what really happened, our intelligence community failed.

"Drowning in red tape, incomprehensible data, and daily tons of paper, burdened with so much trivia that no forest is visible among the trees, constantly prejudiced by political judgments and wishful thinking, our intelligence community is repeatedly, consistently, unchangingly, and dangerously weak. That is the thrust of our report, but that is a secret.

"If the CIA and the State Department could provide, digest, and analyze objective intelligence as well as they can plant stories in the media, lead the Congress around, and put the secret stamp on their embarrassments, horrors, and failures, we could all sleep better at night."

Pike's words were a damning indictment. They were also a battle cry for legislation to correct the mistakes of the past and to fund a strong intelligence community with the proper congressional and executive branch safeguards to get the job done.

They also contained a plea for complete publication of the committee report so that the President, the Congress, and the American people together can know the truth upon which to base a rational judgment about where we have been and where we should go.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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PROGRAM The News Center

STATION WRC TV

DATE March 14, 1976 11:00 PM

CITY Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT Soviet Agents Disclosed. *IN TER view with David Phillips*

ANGELA OWENS: The Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, has expressed the Kremlin's displeasure over President Ford's decision to stop using the word "detente." The newspaper said that decision has caused a, quote, "hullabaloo" among some political circles aimed at undermining Soviet-U. S. relations.

BILL STERNOFF: Twenty-three people have been named as Soviet spies here in the United States. Their names appear in an article published by the National Enquirer. The paper is saying that the information in the article came from U. S. intelligence sources, including former CIA official James Angleton and Dave Phillips, a former CIA agent and a man who now represents retired intelligence officers.

Tonight I talked with Dave Phillips. He says he didn't give the names to the National Enquirer. And he explained that even if the names of foreign agents are known, they are not divulged.

DAVID PHILLIPS: There're a lot of different kinds of people working in espionage -- spies and agents and intelligence officers. The people who work in embassies abroad and in this country working for other countries generally are intelligence officers. It exposes them to some risk. If something should happen to one of these Soviets that's been named, for instance, I can assure you that it won't be by the FBI or from the CIA, but perhaps by some "crazy."

Generally, there's sort of a -- not a code of honor, but sort of an understanding between intelligence officers. Generally if you're abroad, you know what they're doing and they know what you're doing in a general way. I'm not speaking about spies. Spies perhaps might exist for twenty-five or thirty years without the opposition intelligence service knowing about them. But not so in the case of intelligence officers. And it's not the practice to go around exposing someone to unnecessary danger just because they're doing the same kind of job you're doing.

STERNOFF: Interestingly enough, Phillips defines a spy as a man who sells secrets about his own country. An intelligence agent is one who gathers information in another country.

Those named as Soviet spies by the National Enquirer -- and here we would call them intelligence agents, by Phillips' definition -- include Soviet U. N. Ambassador Jacob Malik. The paper says seventeen of the alleged spies at the Soviet Embassy here in Washington are military attaches.

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FREEDOM AT ISSUE
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Intelligence cannot help a nation find its soul. It is indispensable, however, to help preserve that nation's safety while it continues the search.

by Leo Cherne

Mr. Cherne presented the following testimony, Dec. 11, at the invitation of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Rep. Otis Pike. Mr. Cherne was one of 12 members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. On Feb. 17 President Ford named Mr. Cherne to the three-man, independent board of intelligence overseers. He will go on leave as chairman of Freedom House's executive committee.

I am grateful for the invitation to testify before this committee. When I received the request earlier this week I was told that representatives of both parties concurred and had expressed the hope that I might present some overview and some sense of future needs for intelligence. I will unavoidably repeat some things you know, perhaps some which have been stated a number of times, but I do hope there will be some observations which will be helpful to you in your most important undertaking. May I first salute this committee for the two main thrusts of its investigation. Under your direction, Mr. Chairman, there has been the effort to determine whether our intelligence has been adequate to the needs and dangers we have faced and whether we have proceeded to obtain the intelligence we require with sufficient regard for the rights of the individual and the obligations of law under the Constitution. Before I expand on those, I think you are entitled to something of my own background against which to measure my observations.

I have been the executive director of the Research Institute of America for nearly forty years. That activity has sharpened whatever capabilities I have as an economist and political scientist. Those forty years have been devoted in good part to the study of the governmental institutions gathered in this city. I confess, at a time when it is fashionable to derogate government, that I have always had a passionate respect for this most difficult, overcriticized, underpaid, and very undervalued activity.

Twenty-four years ago the distinguished theologian, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, urged me to succeed him as chairman of the International Rescue Committee. I have since then occupied that post. That committee was formed days after Hitler came to power for the purpose of assisting the democratic leaders and scholars of Germany whose love of liberty might compel their flight from that country. The IRC has assisted hundreds of thousands of those who have fled fascist, communist, and nondescript forms of totalitarian jeopardy. Those helped have fled the Soviet Union and the military government of Greece, Castro's Cuba and Duvalier's Haiti. We assist those who have been refugees from the communist countries of Central Europe and those who safely reach Hong Kong. We have helped resettle more than 100,000 Cubans who have fled to this country, and are helping 18,000 of the Vietnam refugees to resettle in this country—and many, many others throughout the world.

For more than twenty years I have been chairman of the executive committee of Freedom House, an organization which was founded in 1941, with Eleanor Roosevelt, William Allen White, David Dubinsky, Roy Wilkins, Wendell Willkie and others, to advance the struggle for freedom at

home and abroad. The present chairman of the Freedom House board of trustees is former Senator Margaret Chase Smith.

Just a couple of final personal notes which I do think relevant to this committee's purposes. I have had the privilege in one context or another to serve each President since 1938. Each of these undertakings has involved an opposition to totalitarianism, left or right. On one occasion, I was told that I had incurred the displeasure of the director of the FBI. I had made myself a determined nuisance to Senator Joseph McCarthy beginning one month after he entered the Senate in 1947 and continued that opposition to the Senator until 1954 when the Senate censured him. My attention was drawn to the Senator because of my own deep concern with the Communist Party. I found it alarming that the party, through its instruments in Wisconsin, openly and actively supported McCarthy, if only for the purpose of unseating Senator Robert La Follette, who at that moment had launched an investigation into the extent of communist domination of U.S. labor unions. At a later time I thought that the frequent social contact between Senator McCarthy and FBI Director Hoover inappropriate. My saying so was not appreciated. In time my criticisms of Senator McCarthy and of his disregard for personal rights led to a threat being conveyed to me that libel proceeding would be instituted if I did not desist. I said that such an action would serve a purpose I long thought useful—having the Senator in a court under oath. The threat of action subsided.

Bipartisan protections

Gentlemen, I have not simply recited a personal background, and I do appreciate your indulgence. I hope I am sensitive to the committee's concern for the protection of the right of privacy of American citizens and the conduct of intelligence within the law, and, perhaps most important, for the urgency of assuring the American people that intelligence and personnel of the intelligence community must never again be requested or permitted to perform some service useful to anyone's domestic political purposes. If there is only one object which I would wish my testimony might reinforce, it would be that one. Neither foreign intelligence nor domestic intelligence, not CIA or FBI, must ever again be requested to perform or acquiesce in an activity which, whatever guise is asserted, actually seeks to serve an individual's ambition or a political candidate's or party's purposes. Even minor political favors—wigs, voice changers, whatever else—simply ought to be impermissible.

It is with a kind of relief that I now know as a result of these investigations that the abuse of and by the intelligence community has occurred during the administrations of both parties. This misbehavior has occurred under Presidents who were held in awe, or admired for their grace and youth, or respected for their candor, or revered for the gratitude we reserve for those who got us out of danger, or were seen as simply ruthless, beleaguered, or ambitious. Gentlemen, this has not been a problem more characteristic of one party than the other.

These abuses are perhaps inherent in the fact of power. And all too much power, for too long a time, was en-

joyed—with no restraint by anyone—by a much praised man who held his police post too long and knew too much about too many people, and appeared not at all reticent to convey that fact.

Let me tell you why I am especially relieved to find this a problem not confined to one party. The bipartisan character of these past difficulties means that we can now proceed to a bipartisan set of corrections and protections which even in an election year have a chance of being kept out of partisan politics.

While I am still on the subject of abuses for reasons of personal ambition or political advantage, let me say something about the board on which I serve, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. I do not appear here as a representative of that board or, for that matter, as anyone's representative, but simply as your guest at your invitation. I am not free to speak of the deliberations of that board or the recommendations we have given to a succession of Presidents, but I know of no restraint which can keep me from telling you that on no one occasion have I observed a single member of the board bending a judgment or stressing a weight which would advance the political interest of the particular President, his administration, or party. The very privacy which has been accorded to PFIAB has, I believe, sheltered it from the temptation to grandstand, politick, or otherwise bend before the political winds.

I myself was involved in one very reassuring episode in this respect. I was appointed a member of that board at a point when the Watergate investigation already made it quite clear that there had been a serious breach of faith. Days before I learned of my appointment, I made an address critical of the Watergate affair and of responses to it which had been coming from the White House. I thought Admiral Anderson, chairman of that board, ought to know of my views, and I quickly sent him a copy of those remarks. I received not the slightest suggestion that I desist from such expressions.

Détente—no limit to many hostile actions

Gentlemen, when I was invited to testify, I was, in particular, requested to make some comments on our future requirements in the intelligence area. I regrettably see nothing in the foreseeable future likely to change the fact that sovereign nations remain virtually unimpeded by law in all of those areas which involve national security.

I welcome the fact that efforts toward détente have been made and that there is an increasing realization in and outside of Government that détente is a process, not a conclusion, a means of limiting the most frightful dangers of belligerency. I believe some portion of the American people may have made assumptions about détente not shared by the architects of that policy. I also believe that, initially at least, the policy was oversold. But I am sure I say nothing you do not know vividly when I add that the policy of détente does not effectively limit hostility or ideological warfare or local warfare, or organized subversion, or encouragement of terrorists, or many of the other hazards with which we have become all too familiar.

We live in a far more interdependent world than was the case even five years ago, and things now happen so quickly that the reaction time for those who must make decisions is terribly short, and therefore effective intelligence analysis and estimates are so much more critical. The shock of the oil embargo made that painfully clear. But our dependency on foreign petroleum is only one of a number of areas in which we are dependent on other nations, and they on us. The fact of mutual dependency, however, is no assurance that the economic conduct of nations will be benign; that rivalries will not be painful and dangerous; that food, raw materials, national monetary reserves and a host of other things will not be made the subject of dangerous conflict with our adversaries, and even intervals of extreme tension with one or another of our friends.

These pressures which have radically narrowed the world, even as they have enlarged the hazards we face, will continue

to press our country into conferences, undertakings, new bilateral and multilateral agreements, all of which have as a common purpose the reduction of unrestrained rivalry in arms, resources, and ideas.

Even if this were a lawful world, the dangers would be great. But it is not a lawful world. It is not a world in which nations have a uniform commitment to ethical or legal concepts, and consequently the policy makers in our nation have no alternative but to rely on the very best knowledge, the most objective analysis, the most careful assessment, the most objective estimates.

Just in the field of limiting arms it is urgent that we know all that we can about our own capabilities and about those of any adversary, and particularly the Soviet Union. We have long ago concluded that mutual inspection is unavailable and therefore obviously hope that it is unnecessary. This places a particular burden on the intelligence community, since it is therefore the sensor assuring our safety and a guarantor of whatever prospects for peace we see. I recognize that this must have been said before this committee a score of times.

And yet I think there are certain fundamental truths, now that these hearings are drawing to a close, that must be reemphasized not for the fact of your understanding but for the fact of public understanding of the role and requirement for intelligence.

Less dramatic intelligence

But we do tend, when we talk about intelligence, to look at the more dramatic aspects: the October war, the oil boycott, a massive grain purchase, climactic events in Cyprus, or Angola, or Portugal, or Chile. The fact is intelligence may be at least as valuable in much less dramatic areas: the sharp analysis of trends, political, social, military and economic; potential developments, such as the formation of new cartels like OPEC; economic assessments, including assessments of the most unlikely events. What, for example, our policy-makers need to know, would be the result if, for several years, the industrial nations of the West suffered unabating acute inflation? How sturdy would the democratic governments be? How well would our various international organizations function? Would the European Community remain intact? Would we see the beginning of trade wars as countries sought to protect their weakening currencies?

We have needed to know how the member nations of OPEC both intended to and actually used the wealth acquired since the fall of 1973. The simple fact of quadrupling of petroleum prices set into motion the largest transfer of wealth in modern times. The stability of international monetary arrangements depends on that kind of knowledge. And wise decision making, informed by such intelligence, not only assists the economies of Western industrial nations, but enables us better to know the particular problems of the less developed nations as well.

There is all manner of technology about which we need to have the very best of intelligence. Recommendations are made which must be decided by particular agencies in the Executive Branch that advanced computers be sold to countries which are now not eligible for such purchases, that other forms of high technology be made available. We of course wish to enlarge our balance of trade, strengthen the American dollar in the process. We need to know, among other things, whether certain items which are on restricted lists are sold by us to one country only to be resold to countries which are not eligible. But the much more penetrating questions with which intelligence must deal involve the complicated net assessment of all of the radiating results which flow from the transfer of high technology.

I will not go further with illustrations of the various kinds of intelligence which will continue to be absolutely basic to informed decision making because I am already embarrassed to have said so much about things you clearly know. I'd like to look briefly, however, at the means by which this intelligence is derived. All of us would of course prefer to have this information gathered by and confined to

researchers functioning in libraries, statisticians pouring over trade data, political and economic scientists providing their reasoned projections—and I have just described the great bulk of the work which is performed within the intelligence community. Both in numbers of people and dollars spent, this is the giant slice of the intelligence dollar.

In addition there is information of the most vital kind, not found in libraries, which we must also understand. There are on occasion tactical and collusive arrangements which are part of international trade negotiations, or the pricing of raw materials which are vital to us. There is the entire difficult business of knowing as much as we can of someone else's real intentions.

There are those within the world's intelligence community who believe that terrorism may well prove to be the most serious of tomorrow's hazards. It is already among the most brutal and difficult to anticipate of today's dangers. Without intelligence and whatever clandestine means are needed to secure it, the terrorists would be given an absolutely open field. Even with the very best of intelligence, the terrorist finds easier pickings in open societies. If high-jackings are commonplace in either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, they have done an effective job in hiding that knowledge from us. And yet I am sure we will all instantly agree we would not wish to pay the price of that form of government to secure whatever safety they enjoy from the terrorist.

In each of the areas to which I have addressed these observations, there is a common thread: intelligence is the basic instrument enabling us to anticipate danger—military, political, economic—enabling us to know the direction from which the threat may come, and enabling us if at all possible to apply unprovocative responses in the hope of avoiding the danger.

Intelligence is the means which enables us to reach a widening net of agreements with some measure of confidence that they will be complied with. There is not the slightest prospect of any arms control measure without the most effective application of the technology and intellect which combine to produce good intelligence. And I'd like to observe that we are talking of this at a time when the problem is still relatively manageable. Not many years into the future we will regrettably be dealing with nuclear capabilities which are widespread and at the possible disposal of some who may be tempted to use that capability to suggest nuclear blackmail.

Now let me say some things about the future of subversive warfare or some more modest activities that are included in the phrase "covert action." The Soviet Union has already made it clear that it does not interpret the Helsinki agreement as in any way moderating the urgency of its ideological efforts. Indeed, leaders of the Soviet Union have been remarkably candid in observing that they think the tide is running in their favor. There is no monolithic communist movement, but there are communist parties in most countries which are more or less available to advance the interests of one of the centers of communist power. I am doing no more than describing the events which occurred in Portugal, which presently exist in Angola, which hopefully will not threaten a Spain in transition. The Italian Communist Party may be closer to achieving its purposes in Italy today than it was when we were so fearful of that prospect in the late 1940's. Now, shall we eliminate under any and all circumstances the ability of the United States and other Western democratic nations to try in some modest degree to apply some counterthrust to this otherwise unrestrained subversion? Are we simply to conclude that the very nations which had hoped that Angola might in fact be independent must now sit by helplessly as one form of colonialism is replaced by another?

In a public interview within the past month, Governor Averell Harriman was quoted as saying that his greatest concerns are not with the fall of one city, but rather with the overthrow of countries and governments world-wide by Russian undercover activities. I quote specifically:

The Russians are not nuts, they are not crazy people, they're not Hitler. But they are trying to dominate the world by their ideology and we are killing the one instrument which we have to fight that ideology, the CIA.

Incidentally, I happen to disagree with the bleakness of the Governor's assessment. I do not think these investigations will have that effect. Clearly that is not your purpose. Hopefully, instead, this committee will have added to our understanding of what needs to be done to increase the effectiveness of the intelligence product and the more efficient organization of the community so that it may achieve the ends we require. I do regret, however, that it is in the nature of an investigation, especially one which focuses on inadequacies and misbehavior, that the resulting public understanding will neither be complete nor balanced. You have identified some of the notable intelligence failures. How I wish it had been possible to illuminate some of the very considerable successes! The very fact that they exist is the strongest reason for keeping their nature and their means quite private. I was reminded of this just last week, in seeing an old movie on television, *Tora, Tora, Tora*, that "in the interest of vital security" even a President, Franklin Roosevelt, was for a time taken off the list of those privileged to see the results of the Ultra Machine which broke the codes of our enemies. President Roosevelt was allegedly removed simply because he had been careless.

Unfortunately, an investigation like this one does not provide the opportunity for the public to have the sense of the thousands of decent, able, extraordinarily professional analysts, painstakingly applying research and scholarship, doggedly reviewing prominent and obscure facts and data so that the policy maker may have timely analysis, assessment and recommendations. They are truly an unheralded group of men and women selected from scores of professional disciplines—economists, historians, psychologists, translators, lawyers, monetary specialists, geographers, doctors, military analysts, biologists, cryptographers, optics and communications scientists, and a host of other fields of scholarship working toward a common purpose: that those who must decide have at their disposal the very best of knowledge and understanding to illuminate their decisions.

Where does the danger lie?

Mr. Pike, on Monday night as I watched television news, I heard you say that it is not the Soviet Union which is our greatest danger. If I correctly quote you, you said that the greater danger is that the people no longer believe what their government tells them. I do agree that we have a serious crisis of belief, of confidence in institutions. But let me dissent on two counts. Whatever the failure of our own government—and those failures include this body as well as the Executive Branch—those failures are within our capability to control, correct, or change. That, thank our bicentennial stars, is our good fortune. But whatever danger may lie before us from the Soviet Union or any other foreign source cannot be readily corrected by the American people. No ballot box will diminish that danger, no burst of renewed faith among us can altogether deflect that danger—not here, not in Angola, or Portugal, or Central Europe.

I dissent somewhat, Mr. Pike, on other grounds; they are no less serious. There is a crisis of belief in our government, as you have said, but it is not simply that. We are in the midst of a crisis of all authority, of all of our institutions. Those who study the public opinion of the American people agree that our regard for all our institutions—medicine, education, religion, military, the Executive Branch, the Supreme Court, the Congress, business, organized labor—our confidence in each of them is at the lowest point since we have measured these attitudes. In fact, a majority of the American people do not have high confidence in a single one of these institutions—not even medicine or religion.

I suggest, therefore, that when any of us who are leaders in any walk of American life think we can repair our own misfortune by identifying the greater distress of someone

else's trouble, we may be deluding ourselves. We may indeed be the architects of our own mutual terminal agonies. We all share the difficulties of what Eric Hoffer calls an "age of disillusionment." A novelist reminded us a number of years ago—it was James Joyce—"History is a nightmare from which we awaken." While there is still time, I urge we end this orgy of reciprocal abuse, escalating disbelief, and profligate accusations. There are sins enough which we have committed, but it is not for these that we seek expiation as much as for the difficulties and frustrations which simply flow from the fact that we are living in the most complex and dangerous time in the entire history of mankind. We must, I think, very soon put aside our denigrations and concentrate once again on the affirmative tasks of protecting liberty, individual and national. Until then, we condemn ourselves to suffer the consequences of each other's misbehavior.

I will conclude, gentlemen, by telling you of a most extraordinary coincidence. I received the invitation to share these thoughts with you on Monday. On Tuesday I was obliged to travel to California. On that plane, sitting directly behind me was an old, tired, stooped and, to me, remarkably small woman. I had imagined her to be taller. Because she is a person whose wisdom is widely conceded, I imposed on her. I told her that I would be testifying today and that I knew that the problems in her country were quite different from ours. I thought nevertheless that she might have some observations which would be useful to me, and asked whether I might put four questions to her. I will recall that exchange as exactly as I noted them immediately after I returned to my seat.

"Mrs. Meir, both of our countries are democracies. We accept ethical and religious restraints on our behavior. Do we have any right whatever, Mme. Prime Minister, to conduct covert programs in other countries, to meddle in their affairs, seek to change their outcomes?"

"Mr. Cherne, we forget that other countries are not like ours. They are not governed by the same restraints. They don't hesitate to do the things which democracies worry about. Look now at Angola. Must we all sit by and watch? Mr. Cherne, I attended a Socialist conference in Berlin last February, and we heard then what would happen in Portugal. And we did nothing. And it happened as they said it would. But we remain paralyzed by our own doubts and confusions."

"But Mrs. Meir, our Congress understandably feels it must know what is being undertaken. Don't you have the same feelings and pressures in your Parliament, your Knesset?"

"Frankly, no. We have a Foreign Affairs and Security

Committee of the Knesset, but they do not expect to be told of things that would be better if they did not know. But perhaps we feel a sense of danger which is not felt in your country. Also our representatives, Mr. Cherne, know that we will not use our intelligence abilities for things which are political, which intelligence people should not meddle in."

"Mrs. Meir, can you tell me, since our countries each have excellent intelligence services, how did we miss the Yom Kippur war?"

"Well, I will tell you this: we should not have missed it. I think we had enough information, but there was obstinacy. It was not read properly. And you know your people did the same thing and helped reinforce our refusal to believe what we should have understood. No, I tell you, we should not have missed that one."

"One final question, Mrs. Meir, do you have problems keeping things secret which must be secret?"

"Sometimes. But not as in your country. But this is a problem of democracies. If you'll forgive me, it's a misunderstanding of democracy. Because a country is democratic, must everything be known? Must we weaken ourselves and strengthen our enemies? In democracies we think all countries are like ours. Unfortunately, Mr. Cherne, they are not."

Mr. Chairman, I sometimes think we act as though we're a group of honorable men playing poker in a 19th century saloon. There, if someone made an effort to look at another player's cards, he'd run a high risk of getting shot. In the game of nations, if we don't, we run a similar danger.

In 1888 Lord Bryce in *The American Commonwealth* said that America was "sailing a summer sea towards which as by a law of fate the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move." Ambassador Moynihan, in the 1976 *The American Commonwealth* recently said, "Liberal democracy on the American model tends to the condition of the monarchy in the 19th century: a holdover form of government, one which persists in isolated and peculiar places here and there, and may even serve well enough for special circumstances, but which has simply no relevance to the future. It is where the world was, not where it is going."

Mr. Chairman, both comments, a century apart, are eloquent. I believe they were both, at least in part, wrong. We were neither sailing a summer sea then, nor are we about to fall off the edge now. The world's troubles are great and our problems in dealing with them manifest. This committee is devoting its serious thought to some of those problems. Intelligence cannot help a nation find its soul. It is indispensable, however, to help preserve that nation's safety while it continues the search.

The CIA, the Times and Freedom House

Following the President's Feb. 17 appointment of Leo Cherne, long-time board member of Freedom House, to the new three-man intelligence oversight board, the New York Times in a news story raised the question of CIA channelling of \$3,500 to Freedom House through a private foundation.

The fact: Freedom House has never, overtly or covertly, received funds or any other assistance from the CIA or any other intelligence agency. The Times ascertained this fact from its own sources before it published the account linking the name of Freedom House with the CIA. Yet the Times mentioned

Freedom House in the Feb. 20 story.

Freedom House immediately wrote the director of the CIA demanding explicit proof that no CIA funds had ever gone to Freedom House by any channel, overt or covert. At the same time, Freedom House told the Times that "in 35 years" Freedom House had never "accepted CIA funds for any purpose."

The Times reported, Feb. 21, that Freedom House sent the letter to the CIA but again excluded from its story our denial that CIA funds had ever been received by Freedom House.

FREEDOM AT ISSUE
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Before Reforming the "Intelligence Community," What Questions Must be Asked?

by W. Thomas Nichols

This article was prepared before the President announced, Feb. 17, a reorganization of intelligence operations. Since the reforming of intelligence services will continue for some time, the central theme of this article—questions to be asked in making changes in intelligence—is no less pertinent.

With so much attention being focused on the American intelligence community today, it is possible that public concern might be whipped to such a high peak by overzealous reformers that serious harm could be done to one of the most important bulwarks of our national security.

Perhaps reform is in order; however, before we consider reform, we should look at the entire community to see what is being done, and then question whether that work can be done better.

George Washington began the process which grew into the American intelligence community when he hired several espionage agents to report on British troop movements during the Revolutionary War.

From that handful of men the community has grown, especially since the Second World War, to include more than 150,000 workers in seven agencies and the three military services. These people undertake various projects which cost the American taxpayer approximately \$6 billion a year, according to data inserted into the Congressional Record by Senator William Proxmire on April 10, 1973.

The intelligence structure

At the top of the intelligence community is the President of the United States who as commander-in-chief of our armed services and main foreign policy maker needs the most reliable information upon which to base his estimates of fast-breaking international events. He also needs information with which to study policy alternatives in order to select those which best promote our national interests and security. The President is never more than moments away from a red telephone link with the watch officers of the community so that he can be alerted to any danger or any major international event.

Before the President goes abroad on a diplomatic tour, or receives a foreign dignitary here at home, he is given oral and written background briefings to bring him up to date about the issues likely to be raised in the expected meetings. The President also receives routine briefings and reports in the White House.

Working for the President as the general overseer of the intelligence community is the National Security Council. Of its several committees, two give the main direction to the intelligence community. The first is its Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) the membership of which includes the President's National Security Adviser (chairman), the Director of Central Intelligence (vice chairman), the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs. This committee sets requirements and provides supervision for

the overall intelligence gathering and analysis efforts of the entire community.

A second important National Security Council group, the 40 Committee, has the same membership as the NSCIC except that the representative of the Treasury is not a member and the Deputy Secretary of State is replaced by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs. This group approves all covert actions abroad and other special high-risk activities. By approving covert actions this committee serves as a general control over such projects and acts as a buffer for the President who is therefore not directly involved in 40 Committee decisions.

Working below these two committees is the Director of Central Intelligence. Although he is a member of both committees, he serves as their focal point for the day-in and day-out coordination of all community activities. His assistant, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, usually serves as the chief administrator of the Central Intelligence Agency. However, this distinction becomes blurred when the Director of Central Intelligence chooses to run the CIA himself.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created as the successor to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an intelligence agency of the Second World War. The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (a law which also created the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and a separate military service for the Air Force). That law authorized the CIA to gather intelligence from the entire community and from its own sources abroad, and to evaluate and piece together bits of information into end-product reports and estimates for the President and other civilian and military leaders.

Also included in the CIA mandate in that 1947 Act is its task "to perform such other functions and duties as the NSC may from time to time direct," in short, clandestine activities approved by the 40 Committee; however, that act specifically denies the CIA any "police, subpoena, law enforcement, or internal security functions."

A military version of the CIA was created in 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency, which coordinates the military intelligence operations of the three armed services and produces military reports and estimates for the top leaders of the Department of Defense.

In a semi-autonomous relationship with the CIA, each of the armed services has its own intelligence organization to meet the tactical intelligence needs of the field commanders and Pentagon staffs. Each of the three services also maintains a cryptologic service to protect its own communications and to gather intercepted communications materials for the National Security Agency.

The largest of all intelligence agencies in size of personnel is the National Security Agency, so named in 1952 but created earlier. The NSA is a cryptologic agency which both monitors foreign communications and provides for the security of all U.S. governmental communications. Often the press refers to NSA as the "super-secret" agency because of the sensitivity of its double tasks.

Our most expensive intelligence agency is involved with overhead reconnaissance. It like the NSA is also within the Department of Defense and semi-autonomous. Operated by the Air Force this agency conducts all air and space surveillance missions for the entire community. Although

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the effort is very costly because of the extreme expense of the vastly complicated technological equipment involved (we spend over one-third of all our intelligence funds in this area, if reports are correct), the cost is justified by the great reliability of this type of information.

Parts of other agencies are formal members of the intelligence community. In the State Department the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) coordinates information from our diplomatic posts abroad with intelligence from other community sources to meet the needs of the State Department. The INR is the smallest of the major intelligence agencies.

Other small parts of the intelligence community are units within the FBI (for keeping track of illegal internal subversive and conspiracy activities, in addition to criminal records), the Treasury (counterfeiting, smuggling, and the personal security of the President and major presidential candidates), and the Energy Research and Development Administration which joined the intelligence community within the past two years. This last agency keeps watch on information relating to oil and other sources of energy.

All of these agencies form the U.S. intelligence community, but any agency of government may become involved if asked to supply the community with any specific information!

Our intelligence system is not perfect, of course. Abuses have occurred and measures should be taken to avoid their recurrence. But reform should have one major objective: the creation of a streamlined system more responsive to our nation's needs.

I worked in intelligence for most of the 1950's. Now from the academic world quite removed from the constant race to keep our leaders the best informed in the world, let me suggest a few basic questions which are preliminary to any thought of reform.

1. Does the vast amount of communications, electronic, photographic, and diplomatic intelligence data which is fed into the system every day produce an overload for the system?

The channels of communication should be open for both the regular flow of information from the bottom to the top, and for any emergency crisis warning.

Just prior to the Cuban missile crisis Fidel Castro's own pilot was overheard in a Havana bar boasting that Cuba now had long-range missiles and feared the U.S. no more. This was reported without comment and went unnoticed. Later photographs taken of two of the ships en route from the USSR to Cuba showed wide hatches on the side. The photographs also clearly showed that the ships were riding high in the water. Missiles of the Soviet Union at that time were large in size but not heavy in weight. Those ships obviously contained missiles, so an analyst reported. But the photographic report did not reach Washington until *after* the crisis was in full bloom.² The system was apparently overloaded with so much other information that these reports could not move up to provide an urgent warning.

2. How frequently are the existing priorities for intelligence collection examined?

The year 1941 was one in which two surprise attacks occurred. Stalin was caught off guard when Hitler attacked the USSR on June 22, 1941, and the United States was completely surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Hence the first priority for all intelligence systems is to prevent another surprise attack. But below this first and most important priority, the lesser items in which we are interested change with the flow of events.

Since our world changes so fast, I wonder if we are seeking information no longer necessary. Do we keep our priorities under constant review?

3. Does our ranking of priorities provide enough guidance for intelligence officials who must consider the opportunity costs of using resources for one purpose rather than another?

In November 1971 the Director of Central Intelligence established a new advisory group called the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee to pull together a community-wide intelligence budget so the President could better see where the money was being spent across the entire

community. Even if money were of no concern, and in today's economic condition it certainly is, time alone would force a choice among information requests in the assignment of men and equipment to their specific tasks.

4. Would better efficiency be served by having all joint intelligence collection, overt as well as covert, controlled by one agency with analysis and publication dispersed among the various agencies?

The centralization of collection could produce economic savings, but it could also produce bad results, especially if such a centralized program were to be misdirected. Our present system of dispersed collection and analysis provides a form of checks and balances, one agency against the others. For example NSA in fact warned the Navy that the intended 1968 Pueblo trip into the North Korean region was in the high risk category. Unfortunately the warning had no effect, and the resulting Pueblo story is too well known for further commentary.

I personally do not see much advantage in centralized control over the collection of intelligence, but I think the question could be studied at length to see if the proposition has any merit.

After collection, the next step is the processing of raw information into intelligence by translation, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation.

5. How much of each agency's resources is allocated toward the accomplishment of its own basic mission and how much is shared in support of the other agencies within the community?

The main purpose of the intelligence community is to produce vital information for the President and other top civilian and military leaders of government. In performing their assigned tasks the agencies ask each other for assistance. This lateral transfer in fact makes the arrangement into a community.

However, instead of simply replying to requests for assistance, some agencies duplicate research and analysis in areas mainly assigned to others. Inter-agency rivalry often produces this in-house duplication of effort as one agency does for itself tasks which it considers not being done well or not being fully shared by other agencies within the community.

Some of this duplication is wasteful, but some of it provides a cross check on the validity of the work being done by the agency mainly assigned the basic task at hand. Each agency sees a piece of information in terms of its own perspective, military, economic, or political. Diversity of interpretation provides a variety of aspects for the top decision makers to consider. However, if agency bias distorts its own reports, then decisions may be based on faulty intelligence analysis.

An example was described by Patrick McGarvey in his book on the CIA. In late 1967, military analysts underestimated energy strength in Vietnam. CIA analysts, reportedly not trying to support "victory-is-around-the-corner" statements, estimated a much higher figure. The initial success of the Viet Cong in their Tet Offensive early in 1968 showed that the higher figure was the more accurate.³

Our last question deals with the vital issue of control.

6. How can the intelligence community best be supervised?

Congress from the outside and the Executive Branch from the inside both have supervisory functions over the intelligence community. In Congress at present there are four subcommittees containing appropriations and military services members. These four subcommittees have a total membership of only 11 senators and 19 representatives. Hence these four subcommittees represent a rather small club. For this club to be enlarged some long-standing committee rivalries will have to be solved. All efforts to add membership to this select group, particularly to add members from the foreign and international relations committees, have been rebuffed since Mike Mansfield's first proposal for a joint watchdog committee was turned down in 1956.

Both the Rockefeller and Murphy commission reports,⁴ which were released at about the same time in June 1975,

suggest the creation of a joint congressional watchdog committee to provide better supervision by Congress over the intelligence community. However, the first obstacle to such a joint committee is Congress itself because of the internal rivalries among the various committees.

Another obstacle is the intelligence community. A protective instinct produced by years of trying to prevent intelligence leaks to foreign governmental agents and agencies brings many intelligence community leaders to a point of permanent fear that information shared with any larger number of congressmen will be leaked to our press and thus to all foreign intelligence agencies.

It seems to me that the problem could be solved in a three-part process. First, all members of a new joint intelligence watchdog committee could go through the same intelligence clearance as do all others with access to top secret information. Second, congressional watchdogs could waive all immunity and be subject to exactly the same laws which guarantee the security of our classified information. Third, Congress could pass a law providing for the declassification of secret documents and information in addition to the usual executive procedures, by means of a court order. Before such an order, a federal judge could listen to a congressman's arguments for the release of the information, and to arguments against such release by a representative of the intelligence community.

This third process would be slow, but the courts have worked exceptionally well during the Watergate process and judicial settlement of disputes between legislative and executive officials is a long standing (and sometimes the only) remedy.

Perhaps with these safeguards, such a watchdog committee might be at least tolerated, if not exactly welcomed, by members of the intelligence community. Its main work would evolve around budgetary hearings.

Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution states: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time." At present the total intelligence budget is hidden within the general budget, unknown to most senators and representatives except for those in the four subcommittees mentioned earlier. It is very difficult to determine just how to meet the Constitutional requirements and yet keep important developments within our intelligence community from being detected by foreign agents who avidly study all published information from our Congress. Perhaps a general appropriation for each agency could be recommended to Congress by the committee, but this step needs far more study before it is

actually implemented.

The President has at least three avenues of control over the intelligence community. About once a month the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board meets to examine intelligence successes and failures. It is a blue-ribbon panel of extremely gifted people, like Dr. Land who contributed much to the development of the famous U-2 aircraft, which flew with special Polaroid cameras. Members of this panel, however, are so busy that it is difficult to see how they could become further involved with time consuming tasks of more intensive supervision. I would guess that the PFIAB will continue to function about the way it does at present, as a trouble shooter for the President.

A second tool of control from outside the community is the Office of Management and Budget which has a small staff of five persons who review budget estimates from the intelligence community. This small OMB office with its tiny staff is simply not able to do more than give the \$6 billion budget a quick going over. If the President wanted to check the community more thoroughly, he could enlarge this office and increase the extent of its review of the entire intelligence budget.

But the most effective tool would be inside the community itself. For years the Director of Central Intelligence has been mainly the director of the CIA. Recently, William Colby has worked very hard on his community-wide activities. However, he was hindered by his rank. He had to try to supervise all the other agencies from about the same level as their own directors. I believe the Director of Central Intelligence would have more supervisory clout throughout the community if he were elevated to cabinet rank in a position similar to that of the Attorney General, who is above the FBI. The Senate already holds hearings before confirming the person nominated to fill the position of Director of Central Intelligence. I believe elevation in rank would increase the supervisory capabilities of the DCI without interfering with the duties of the National Security Advisor to the President.

These, then, are some of the questions which I believe should be considered in any study of the possibilities of reform of our intelligence system.

Notes

1. Most of this section was based on public information contained in the *Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, Robert D. Murphy, chairman, June 1975, Government Printing Office, pp. 91-95.
2. Roger Hillman, *Time Magazine*, 1964, Delta paperback #8954, pp. 175, 187.
3. Patrick McGarvey, *The CIA*, New York, Saturday Review Press, 1972, pp. 139-144.
4. Commission on CIA Activities, *The Nelson Rockefeller Report to the President*, reprinted in *Nelson Books #22108*, 1975, and *Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, Robert D. Murphy, Chairman, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1975, Chapter 7.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 March 1976

Bush Says Freedom House Did Not Get C.I.A. Funds

In response to a request made three weeks ago, Freedom House, an organization that monitors the degree of freedom enjoyed by the citizens of various countries, has received from the Central Intelligence Agency an assurance that the C.I.A. has never passed funds to the organization.

The assurance came in a letter dated March 2 from

George Bush, the Director of Central Intelligence.

Freedom House has requested the assurance after its name appeared in published reports saying that C.I.A. funds had been channeled in the 1960's to the International Rescue Committee, a humanitarian organization headed by Leo Cherne, one of President Ford's appointees to a new intelligence oversight board. Mr. Cherne is also chairman of Freedom House's executive committee.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 March 1976

Colby Defends Schorr In Release of Document

NEW ORLEANS, March 29 (UPI)—William E. Colby, the former Director of Central Intelligence, says that Daniel Schorr should not be punished for releasing a secret House report on United States intelligence operations.

Mr. Schorr, a CBS News correspondent, "carried out

his obligation to the First Amendment to the Constitution and to himself as a newsman and should not be punished," Mr. Colby said in a panel discussion at Tulane University last night.

Mr. Colby said, however, that some of the information in the report should not have been made public, and that Mr. Schorr had "convinced the world that Americans cannot keep a secret."

Western Europe

Wednesday, March 24, 1976

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

U.S., Europe feud over Communists

Americans express apprehension over possibility that party members will soon have major positions in governments

By John Cadman
Special to

The Christian Science Monitor

Paris

Are we coming up again for one of those periods of American-European recrimination?

No, we are already in one, without anyone much noticing.

The Americans fear that sooner or later, probably sooner, there will be Communists in government in some West European states, notably France or Italy. Both these countries are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), though France is not militarily integrated.

American apprehensions, and they were no more than that, were recently expressed by Gen. Alexander Haig, the NATO commander in Europe (formerly Richard Nixon's chief of staff at the White House) at a private meeting in Munich. They have been expressed, too, by the political counselor at the American Embassy in Paris to Gaston Defferre, the Socialist mayor of Marseilles. And U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger delivered the same message to French Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand when the Frenchman was in Washington last fall.

Vice-President Rockefeller got into the argument in Paris Monday when he commented at a news conference on French statements to the effect that U.S. warnings against Communist participation in some future French government constituted U.S. interference in French domestic affairs. Mr. Rockefeller said that the U.S. would indeed "have to reappraise its position" if Communists got into the government of any European country with which Washington had aid agreements to defend the West against Communist military aggression.

One of the points that the Americans were

trying to make was that, if ever there were Communists in government in one or more countries in Western Europe, then the effect of American public opinion would be unpredictable, to say the least. The gut American reaction might well be, "Well, let's bring our boys home from Europe then. If the Europeans do not want to defend themselves against communism, why should we do it for them?"

The European reaction in France and, to a lesser extent, in Italy, has been emotionally predictable. "An unwarranted interference in our own internal affairs." "American imperialism" and the like.

In Paris, the Communists join forces with the right wing of the Gaullist party to condemn American interference, so-called. The American reader must remember that to be a Communist in France or Italy is as French as eating French fries or as Italian as eating pasta. If you say, at a Paris gathering, "I am a Communist," people would no more look at you than if you had said, "I see Ford's keeping up in the latest primaries."

The fact of the matter, of course, is that there is every likelihood that Communist ministers will soon be in power in both Italy and France.

Italy. The Communist Party pulls down more than a fifth of the vote. It already has made what it calls its "historical compromise," that is, it is prepared to go into government with the conservative Christian Democrats. In one of Italy's recurring political crises, that seems likely to happen, sooner or later. At the recent 25th Congress of the Soviet Party in Moscow, the Italian Communist leader, Enrico Berlinguer, defended his "independent" line.

France. The Left is doing well, as exemplified by the latest regional elections in

which it scored more than 50 percent of the vote. The French Socialists are allied with the French Communists in an electoral pact. If the Socialist leader, Mr. Mitterrand, had been elected President in 1974 (he lost only by a few thousand votes) then the Communists would now have four ministers in government. The Socialists and Communists combined hope to control the French Parliament after the next general elections in 1978. They will thus be able to block any or all legislation proposed by conservative French President Giscard d'Estaing.

One European argument is that if the Communists enter government, they will be made to share the electoral responsibility for economic problems and that in some way they will become even more "independent" of Moscow.

For other Europeans this begs a crucial question. Why is a Communist a Communist if he can equally well be a Social Democrat? The heart of the matter is about power. "It is," one Frenchman told this correspondent, "the Soviet Union's only exportable commodity, witness Angola. Tomorrow what? Mozambique, Rhodesia, South Africa?"

What many Europeans (except the West Germans who can actually see the Berlin Wall and the wire that the East Germans have put up to make a border) do not seem to realize is a simple fact: It is precisely because of the American military presence in West Europe that the Communist parties of France and Italy can afford to be so "independent."

If they were down the road, over the Elbe, where American and Soviet troops met after World War II, they would not enjoy that freedom of maneuver now granted them and now disallowed in such countries as East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Not to speak of Czechoslovakia, given "fraternal help" in 1968.

NEW YORK TIMES
MARCH 27, 1976

Italy's Communists Deny They Get Aid From the East Bloc

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

ROME, March 26—The Italian Communist Party today described as "false and ridiculous" reports that it continues to receive financial aid from the Soviet Union and other East European countries.

In an official statement, the party said that the sources of its funds were only those listed in its budget "and no other." It called the reports part of a "calumnious campaign" being "orchestrated by American circles" to detract from recent scandals and to "place in doubt the full independence" of the party from the Soviet Union.

The statement was prompted by an article published in the New York Times yesterday that quoted Western diplomats, including American officials and several Italian sources, as having suggested that the party continued to receive direct and indirect financial support from East European nations. The dispatch included denials from Communist party officials.

Several Italian newspapers today reported the Times story, although L'Unita, the party's newspaper, made no mention of it. The newspapers also quoted from an article in this week's New Republic, which also quoted sources as having said that the party continued to receive such support, including funds earned as commissions on trade with Eastern Europe.

The party statement said the reports represented a "clumsy and awkward" attempt to discredit the party.

NEW YORK TIMES
19 MAR 1976

CHIRAC ASSERTS U.S. MEDDLES IN FRANCE

PARIS, March 18 (AP)—Prime Minister Jacques Chirac denounced what he termed "uncalled for" American intervention in French internal affairs today as United States Ambassador Kenneth Rush met with the Socialist leader, Francois Mitterrand, reportedly for the third time in 18 months.

Mr. Mitterrand also attacked what he said were President Ford's "particularly unwarranted remarks" on French domestic politics.

Warnings from President Ford, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and American diplomats that Communists participation in a future French left-wing coalition government would be viewed with disfavor

in Washington have caused an uproar among French politicians. The United States Embassy in Rome, uneasy over possible participation by Communists in an Italian government, similarly warned Italian officials today.

Both the Italian and French Communist Parties say they are pursuing their own kinds of Marxism-Leninism and are committed to achieving power through parliamentary means. While the United States is upset over the prospect of Communists sharing power in France and Italy, allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Soviet Union is also making angry statements. But Moscow's irritation arises from the Western parties' pursuit of "national" communism.

NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 28, 1976

Communists in Italy Content To Gather Power Slowly

By ALVIN SHUSTER

ROME—Italy's Communist Party, the largest in Western Europe, has scored another success by gaining control with the Socialists of the local administration of Latium, the populous region that includes Rome itself. And so, once again, the party finds itself with an opportunity to demonstrate that "Communists know how to govern" and to build on its reputation of efficiency and responsibility.

That reputation, coupled with the weakness of the still-dominant Christian Democrats, continues to propel the Communists up the political ladder and toward national power. They control all the major cities north of the capital and there are now Communist or Communist-Socialist administrations in six of Italy's 20 regions and more than 40 of its 94 provinces.

At the regional and provincial levels, the Communists are quite willing to work with their old rivals, the Socialists. And the Communists are winning a fair amount of praise for efforts to meet local needs. The national Government, however, raises another question and here the Communists remain committed to their "historical compromise," a share of power in the Cabinet, not just with the Socialists, but with Christian Democrats and other non-Communist forces.

Their present strategy at the national level is to wait until the conditions are ripe for that kind of grand national coalition, when their share of the vote grows, when the Christian Democrats realize that there is no other choice and when the chances of any strong reaction, at home or abroad, subside. The official party line is: "We are in no hurry."

To Avoid Splitting the Nation

But events in Italy are clearly moving in their direction and a share of national power for the Communists could well come after the elections scheduled for next year. They came within two percentage points of overtaking the Christian Democrats as Italy's largest party in the local and regional voting last June. Their role as the opposition party has helped. For the time being, the party's leaders are content to stand back and criticize. Every economic or governmental crisis that tears at the Christian Democrats leaves the Communist Party that much stronger, and there are crises of both kinds around today.

What will happen if the Communists do emerge with the biggest share of the votes in the next election? There is nothing in Italy's Constitution that requires the largest

party to form the new government and there is nothing in the rhetoric of the Communist Party that suggests it would want to. As Enrico Berlinguer, the party leader, has often explained, a national coalition limited to Socialists and Communists is not the party's goal. He has stressed that if the Socialists and the Communists joined in forming a Popular Front government, even with a combined majority, the nation would become polarized and, he argues, the Communists want to avoid splitting the nation into two hostile camps.

Still, there is the possibility that the Communists could change their minds, under pressure from their rank and file members. If the Communists and the Socialists do obtain that Parliamentary majority next time, no matter how slim, it might well be tempting to force the Christian Democrats into the opposition and then see what happens.

One of the major reasons for the success of the Communists, is the condition of the Christian Democrats, who have governed for 30 years, presented a series of familiar faces and policies and always stopped short of bringing about basic reforms. The bureaucracy is encrusted and unresponsive, hospitals and schools are in chaos, the economy is in trouble and the Christian Democrats are constantly brushed with scandal, most recently in the Lockheed revelations.

Still, the Communists have more going for them than the spotty record of the Christian Democrats. They retain the general reputation for honesty, despite some recent charges against two Communists involved in local corruption cases. And they have worked hard to demonstrate their independence from the Soviet Union—by openly declaring their belief in basic freedoms, by stressing their "national road" to Socialism, by voicing their support for the Common Market and the need to maintain Italy's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Links to Moscow

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and President Ford repeatedly argue that the presence of Communists in a government in Italy would threaten the future of the alliance and weaken Western Europe. But the Italian Communists counter that any effort on their part to pull Italy out of the alliance would upset the equilibrium between East and West.

"There is just no possibility that our country would become part of an Eastern military and economic bloc directed by the Soviet Union," a senior party official has said. "Italy must remain independent and we want to see both blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—fade, through mutual disarmament."

The issue of the party's continuing links to Moscow through the international Socialist movement remains worrisome for many Italians and for Washington. Despite strong denials from the Italian Communist Party, American officials, for example, insist that the party still receives direct and indirect financial aid from the Soviet bloc and follows Moscow's line on many foreign policy issues.

"For the Communists to come into the Government would just be too great a risk," said a diplomat here. "The top of the party now says it is autonomous and how long would they last? Is there a more radical base that would overthrow them? And, as for NATO, the issue is whether the alliance could survive."

The answers to many of the questions will not be found until after the Communists begin to share power here. They are on their way, moving gradually but surely toward the reins. To many here, it just seems a matter of time.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1976

Mammoth in the Swamp

By C. L. Sulzberger

ROME—There are hints that "homo boobus," H. L. Mencken's affectionate term for the political American, is at last starting to realize his country is plummeting down the power slide. The coming splash could be a dismal experience for the freedom whose second century he celebrates this year. Overseas one encounters more than hints.

Last week Moshe Dayan, Israel's former Defense Minister, publicly warned that Israel must have the "nuclear option" because the United States can no longer police the world. A French newspaper editorial added: "Who today, in Moscow or among French or Italian Communist leaders, could really fear the U.S.? A country which permitted Communist tanks to triumph in Indochina and Angola isn't likely to use its armor to intervene in Europe to squash an extreme left electoral success. . . ."

Nor is the picture of indomitable America much embellished when its chief military officer, General Brown, announces the Soviet Union is outspending and outbuilding us in most military respects and now has more than twice as many men under arms, over six times the annual tank production and a steadily widening missile advantage.

The net result is that we are seen abroad to be following Teddy Roosevelt's policy adage—in reverse. Today Washington's fashion seems to be to talk increasingly loud while carrying a little stick. Nowhere is this more acutely noticed than in Italy, a land loyal to power. Italians like the winning side.

The American image has been further hurt by revelations of Central Intelligence Agency activities, some in this country, of large-scale bribery and influence peddling (a system still familiar here but welcomed only by its direct beneficiaries when a foreign donor is involved). All this tarnish of an old friend and protector comes at a moment of deep pessimism.

Once again the lira has been devalued, increasing discontent because of rising prices of imported meat, discouraging stability by further diminishing the chance of investment from abroad. Labor productivity, once a feature of the postwar "Italian miracle," has gone to the dogs. The foreign debt of around \$15 billion exceeds gold and hard money reserves.

It is therefore no surprise that the well-organized and brilliantly led Italian Communist Party (itself fed on trade kickbacks) continues to increase its strength while the dilapidated Christian Democratic apparatus, which provided prime ministers for thirty

years, struggles feebly to keep control like a tranquilized mammoth in a swamp.

Washington takes pains to warn Italians it will not tolerate Communist cabinet ministers in an allied land. Yet the tenor of these warnings has been counterproductive, partly for reasons cited earlier, and inspires little but Italy's renowned cynicism.

The American Embassy is trying to soup up Washington's interest in more overt investment in cultural propaganda. Covert investment is a bad word and anyway most U.S. bribes here have gone to rather smelly people.

We keep reminding Italians that we don't consider their Communist Party a genuinely democratic article. Old Pietro Nenni, the Socialist monument, proclaims: "Maybe they're democratic but all they've done yet is take the first steps." However, when United States spokesmen get into this act they are criticized for interfering in Italy's private affairs.

The only technically non-Italian institution—actually very indigenous

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—in the game of building an alternative to Communism's proffer of "historical compromise" is the Catholic Church. Although Pope John XXIII cut off political cooperation with the Christian Democrats, the Vatican is now moving slowly, gingerly back into the arena.

Early this year Pope Paul said Marxism and Catholicism are not compatible. Parish priests are encouraging lay Catholics to organize new political action groups. Pro-Marxist priests are being quietly ousted or at any rate restrained.

Washington and the Vatican once worked as cobelligerents on Italy's political battlefield, even though our Government never mustered Congressional agreement for an exchange of diplomatic relations with the Holy See—as other devoutly Catholic countries like Japan, Egypt and Finland do.

During the 1948 elections here (when American intrusion into other people's politics was considered honorable), the U.S. Ambassador and local clerical hierarchs often spoke at the same meetings—for the same candidates. That cozy convenience (which raised Baptist hackles) has evaporated.

Washington sends a distinguished American senior citizen briefly each year as our President's personal representative to show we don't wholly boycott popery. Meanwhile, Enrico Berlinguer, the Italian Communist boss who makes a fetish of turning his back on the Kremlin, Marxism's "Vatican," climbs the power ladder rung by rung.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 March 1976

Paying The Price Of Empire

By C. L. Sulzberger

LISBON—Portugal is paying a steep price for the unenviable boast of having been the world's very last great overseas empire. This position, imposed by a myopic dictatorship that was only overthrown two years ago, is at the root of every major problem here today.

Public health, illiteracy, employment, investment, infiltration, production remain at dreadful levels. And things are going badly between Lisbon and its former colonies, although some Cabinet ministers connected with such affairs like to gild the skunk cabbage. As Mario Soares, head of the Socialist Party (this nation's largest), realistically says:

"Totalitarian regimes have been installed there [the ex-colonies] and they are close to the Soviet orbit. The West is paying for its stupidity in not helping movements for independence from the Salazar [Portugal's dictator] regime." José Medeiros Ferreira, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, adds: "We expect to play a difficult role vis-à-vis our former possessions during the next few years."

There is no escaping the United States share in the blame. Our National Security Council decided six years ago to support Portuguese administration in Angola and Mozambique in order to avoid "chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists." This policy produced precisely what it sought to avoid.

Nationalist movements in Portuguese Africa infected the forces sent to restrain them with their own ideology and methodology. These inspired a revolution in Lisbon plus both chaos and near-Communism. African regimes

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

were created that are anti-Western (above all anti-U.S.A.) and even irked with sympathizers here.

Adm. Victor Crespo, Minister of Cooperation (a job once called Colonial Minister), assured me less than one hundred Portuguese are now jailed in Mozambique. The figure is probably six times as large. And residents of that former colony—including those in "re-indoctrination camps" or prison—who don't show up at homes or offices within ninety days, are automatically dispossessed.

The bitter feelings brought to Lisbon by an airlifted 400,000 Angolan refugees have been further soured by events in Mozambique. This stirs an anger that has considerable political importance here. Thirty percent of the new voters enrolled for next month's legislative elections are homeless emigrants from Africa who are also mostly jobless.

Maybe in time these people will prove to be of long-term benefit to

BALTIMORE SUN
20 March 1976

Asking the Communists for Help

Portugal because they represent much talent, energy and enterprise. But right now, despite an impressive national effort to care for them, house them and resettle them, they are unhappy, resentful and potentially dangerous.

Many Portuguese are far from convinced that it was wise for Lisbon to ignore its own pledge (the Alvor agreement) to the three competing Angolan nationalist movements by recognizing the Popular Movement (M.P.L.A.) Government. People here with Angolan experience say M.P.L.A. isn't capable of imposing itself on the entire country, even with Soviet and Cuban support.

With an election in the offing, the decision to recognize was avoided for a while because of differing internal reasons: (1) to court the anti-M.P.L.A. refugee vote; (2) to reaffirm last year's Alvor accord; (3) to avoid irritating the West. But these were all forgotten when Western capitals, led by Paris, rushed to acknowledge M.P.L.A.'s regime while certain Lisbon Provisional Government leaders (now far left of a changing public opinion) urged recognition.

Many disagree with Admiral Crespo's belief that M.P.L.A. is the "only party" capable of governing Angola. Yet a kind of political coup de main was engineered here to support that view. Adm. Rosa Coutinho, a former member of the National Revolutionary Council in Lisbon (once the Portuguese revolution's high commissioner in Angola), has just returned there for reasons nobody can explain.

Admiral Coutinho no longer holds an official position. He is accused by some observers of having helped engineer a Lisbon-Moscow-Havana coup favoring M.P.L.A. while still on the revolutionary council. Crespo says there is no confirmable evidence of this.

The obvious ultimate solution for Portugal is to join the European Economic Community to which all dispossessed former overseas imperial powers belong: Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands. They have discovered they can effectively pool their energies in that common enterprise and at the same time can encourage continued links between industrial Europe and developing Africa.

However, Portuguese Africa, with its long-delayed freedom and currently pro-Marxist bias, is far from playing any role in such a Euroafrican combination. And so is Portugal itself—with its antiquated economy and still-provisional Government unable to undertake long-range obligations.

All peoples live by myths. The compelling myth in Italy today is that only the Communist party is sufficiently able, unified and honest to save the country from communism. Surely not the Christian Democrats, the party that has ruled by itself or with partners for three decades, and which is still marginally larger in popular following than the Communists.

The country is so chaotic, considering its economic miracle of growth second only to Japan's in the past generation, that the current miracle is that it does not simply come to a stop. Italy is a country where judges go on strike, and where the mail piles up until sold for scrap. Premier Aldo Moro's austerity program announced Thursday is the right approach to a persistent inflation and a lira that has declined in value by one-fourth against the dollar in two months. But it is designed to make ordinary Italians materially poorer. Only the Communist party and its trade union confederation could make this work. Small wonder that Mr. Moro consulted Wednesday night with Enrico Berlinguer, the Communist leader.

The question is why the Communists would want to make Christian Democracy or Italy's mixed economy work. The party has toiled for a generation to earn a reputation as the Communist party that played by the national rules, and as Italy's "party with clean hands" unsmudged by the corruption sticking all over Christian

Democrats and others. The party runs Bologna well and is entrusted with other cities and regions. It still stops short of admitting to want what all political parties want, to run the country. "The historical compromise" is its stated ambition, to play junior partner to the Christian Democrats in a grand coalition.

The once-great party of Alcide de Gasperi stops short of granting that, but concedes in the words of its present secretary, Benigno Zaccagnini, that Communist strength is "a popular reality at every level." How long Mr. Moro can pile up political debts to the Communists before paying off is problematical. The United States role in helping Italy's leaders from de Gasperi on is no secret. The embassy warns that the United States would reconsider its relationship should the "historical compromise" take place. The United States has said the same to France's Socialist, Francois Mitterand, who seeks power allied with Communists, only to be spurned. Mr. Moro's Christian Democrats differ from Mr. Mitterand in that they rule, and are in debt to the United States.

What's being talked about are patchwork bandages. Only a rededication and revitalization in the center, whether in the Christian Democratic party or some other, can heal Italy's ailments. This is something that the U.S. embassy can neither command nor finance. It is a task only Italians can perform.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Thursday, March 25, 1976

Italy's ruling Christian Democrats deeply split

By David Willey

Special to

The Christian Science Monitor

Rome

After six days of rowdy and inconclusive debate, Italy's ruling Christian Democrats have emerged from their party congress weakened and deeply divided over what policy to adopt toward the increasingly powerful Communists.

Party secretary Benigno Zaccagnini was re-elected at dawn Wednesday by a narrow margin to lead the party through what is certainly going to be the most critical period in its history. He received the votes of 886,000 party members against 832,000 cast for Arnaldo Forlani, a former party secretary and currently Defense Minister.

The Christian Democrats were united only in rejecting Communist offers of a grand alliance between Roman Catholics and Communists termed "the historic compromise" to solve Italy's pressing economic and social problems. Mr. Zaccagnini and his followers favor a realistic approach to the swing to the Left recorded in last year's local elections and the working out of some formula which would enable the Communists to be consulted on policy matters without necessarily bringing them into government.

Mr. Forlani, however, supported by a solid phalanx of right-wingers favors a tough anti-Communist line aimed at keeping Italy's Marxists in the political wilderness where they have been banished for the past 29 years.

The party congress has conspicuously failed to come up with any new ideas of reform or renewal or even a program on which to fight the looming general election. A general election will have to be held some time within the next year.

Many political observers feel that an autumn election is a strong possibility owing to the feeble nature of the current minority Christian Democrat administration which lacks the necessary clout or consensus to deal with a difficult economic situation.

The party congress proceedings were undignified to say the least. There were fistfights between moderates and diehards. Former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Mariano Rumor was booed off the platform and failed to make himself heard. The prevailing mood was one of rowdiness encouraged by busloads of supporters brought in by opposing factions to brawl at their opponents.

Mr. Forlani tried to win support for a tough anti-Communist line by telling the party right wing what they wanted to hear. He dismissed the charges of corruption and graft in the way the party has been running the country by aping the successful Communist election slogan, "we have clean hands." He can hardly have convinced many impartial observers, however, given the unending revelations of corruption scandals involving ministers and top officials that have been appearing in the press since the Pike and Church reports from the U.S. Congress were leaked earlier this year.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1976

Bonn's Drive Against Spies From the East Also Nets the Innocent

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

BONN, March 23 — Walter Böhm was the chief of a labor union office in Bonn, a respected member of the suburban community of Buschhofen, and a grateful refugee from East German Communism — until Nov. 11, 1974.

He was arrested that day on charges of being a Communist spy, and public interest in his case was intense. A wave of concern about East German agents had begun the previous spring, when the discovery of the spy Günter Guillaume on Willy Brandt's staff forced the Chancellor to resign.

According to American and West German intelligence officers, there are thousands of East German agents in this country. Estimates range all the way to 10,000, and one is arrested almost every week.

The arrests stir up the popular anti-Communism that is always latent here. They also encourage calls for more vigilance against the enemies of democracy in a country that has known democracy for less than 50 years of its history.

Sometimes an innocent victim gets caught in the still imperfect machinery.

'Your Life Comes to an End'

"Your whole life comes to an end," Mr. Böhm remembered.

His employer, the Labor Union Federation chief, Heinz Oskar Vetter, appeared on national television that night and described Mr. Böhm as "a systematic agent" of East Germany.

In Mr. Vetter's interview and in the screaming headlines of

most of the next day's newspapers, there was little indication of doubt that Mr. Böhm was a spy or that he would be convicted of the charges against him.

He was born 57 years ago in what is now East Germany and in 1958, like millions of people before the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, he fled to West Germany. His work as a secret anti-Communist labor union activist in the East began to get dangerous, he says, and he found a position with the union here in 1962, much as Mr. Guillaume had done before him.

"I knew Guillaume," Mr. Böhm said, "and I had worked with him in the Chancellor's Office. He was responsible for labor union matters, so he was the man I had to deal with."

The Guillames, Günter and his wife, Christel, were convicted of espionage last December and sentenced to 13 and 5 years' imprisonment.

After his arrest, Mr. Böhm was taken before a judge in Karlsruhe to plead to the spying charges.

"The secret service said they saw me go into a church without crossing myself," he remembers, "as though I were going in to conceal a secret meeting. And they said I had gone to the Spandau cemetery in West Berlin, and had started to run when I got inside the gate. They had been watching every move I made for three months."

The examining magistrate was not convinced that there were grounds to keep Mr. Böhm and his wife, Irmgard, in jail pending indictment. They were allowed to return home to Buschhofen the next day, while the investigation went on.

"The police had seized all our files and also all our money," he said, "so when we got home to the apartment we didn't have a pfennig." But neighbors came to the rescue.

"They were puzzled, of course," Mr. Böhm recalls, "but they collected pocket money for us and they brought us food. They were very kind."

3 Trips to East Germany

The Böhm's teen-age son and daughter were kept out of school for four days, but as the investigation dragged on they were allowed to return. Their father says they too, were treated kindly by their peers.

Meanwhile he had to submit to a series of investigations and interrogations by the Federal Criminal Office, which continued probing until January of last year.

"They wanted to know why I had made three trips to East Germany," he said, "and I convinced them it was to visit my mother and father in Zittau. They are both too old to travel."

The mysterious run in the cemetery was because it was close to closing time when he arrived at the gate. One by one, the elements of the Government's case began to collapse.

The Labor Union Federation then restored Mr. Böhm's \$370-a-week salary but not his job.

"I didn't even entertain a thought of going back to an organization that would treat me the way they did," Mr. Böhm said—not even after last April 14, when the charges against him were dropped.

The statement from the Federal Prosecutor's Office in Karlsruhe was very short. It said: "The suspicion of secret espionage activity in the case has been eliminated, and the

charges against Mr. Böhm and his wife have been dropped."

So he began looking for a job. "People were very reserved," he says. "They would say they'd be willing to hire me but wanted no problems from the labor unions."

And, he adds, "I had been an executive in Bonn and didn't see why I should be forced to accept a subordinate position now."

"I learned a lot," he reflected. "My faith in the process of justice in a democracy was vindicated, but there were human disappointments, in people like labor-union leaders who are expected to make democracy work."

Finally, last January, Mr. Böhm found a job at no loss of salary, representing the West German European Movement, in a tiny office above a movie theater on the Bonn Market Square.

The organization is a semi-public group that supports the cause of European unity, and the Labor Union Federation supported his application with a letter of recommendation, he said.

The whole bitter experience cost him \$6,000 in lawyer's fees, some of which the state will reimburse him for. A lawsuit that Mr. Böhm brought against seven West German journalists for libel came to nothing.

And the damage to his reputation remains.

"People look at me sideways, and when they hear my name they do a double take," he says. "It's ironic. The East Germans could have arrested me as a West German spy before I left in 1958 — but instead it happened here."

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Tuesday, March 23, 1976

Spain's communist puzzle

Solzhenitsyn blasts 'utopian progressives'

By Joe Gandelman
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Madrid

Spain's communists: legalize them or not? The latest voice urging caution is exiled Soviet novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

The message, on a talk show broadcast here over state-run television, was largely directed at "utopian Spanish progressives" and the West. It included these key points:

- "I ask your progressives: Do you know what a dictatorship is? I see you have recently had a limited amnesty. . . . During 70 years we (the Soviet people) have never had an amnesty. We went to jail to die in them. . . ."

- "To those that want democratic reforms quickly: Do you know what's going to happen tomorrow or the day after tomorrow? Tomorrow you will have democracy. But the day after tomorrow — do you know it won't fall into totalitarianism?"

- Unlike Soviets, Spaniards can travel to

other cities and abroad, buy foreign magazines, make photocopies (considered "counter revolutionary in the Soviet Union), and, though illegal, go on strike without fear of imprisonment or firing squad.

- The West has weakened Spain's defenses. And Western liberals who so loudly cried out against the executions of five Spanish urban guerrillas last fall do not raise their voices against the millions executed in the Soviet Union.

Coincidentally or otherwise, the 45-minute lecture on the popular Saturday night show "Directísimo" could hardly have come at a better time for the government. Only last week the Cortes (Parliament) was asked to lift a 1936 ban on various political parties, except extremists — notably the Communists.

This restriction is expected to cause rumblings among scattered opposition groups who demand 100 percent democracy — immediately.

The Communists are well-organized. Their coalition, the democratic Junta, recently

hooked itself to the Christian Democrat and Socialist-led Democrat Platform in a "united front." Communist influence protrudes into clandestine labor unions, universities, and into an increasingly frisky press.

In addition, Mr. Solzhenitsyn predicts Spain's "qualities" and "great love of spiritual matters" would help the West "in its battle against communism."

The Spanish Government may not see things quite the way the author of Gulag Archipelago does.

Madrid wants diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, against which General Franco's Blue Division of volunteers fought alongside the Nazis during World War II. Direct Spanish-Soviet truck transport links were initiated in January (a five-day trip), and various exchanges have taken place over the years.

At the same time, Madrid would like to short-circuit Radio Liberty, the formerly CIA-financed U.S. station which has beamed information and entertainment to the Soviet Union from Spain's Costa Brava for 15 years.

Africa

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Tuesday, March 23, 1976

Policy Problem

Black-Rule Movement Is Spreading in Africa, Putting U.S. on Spot

Soviet-Cuban Role Speeds Trend and Leads Critics To Question U.S. Stance

Making Heroes of Russians

By ROBERT KEATLEY

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON—First Angola. Then Rhodesia. Then Namibia. Finally, the toughest of all, South Africa.

That has long been the program of black Africans determined to end minority white rule on their continent, and it is coming to pass.

Thanks to Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola, the movement is gaining momentum. It has also grown increasingly violent and threatens to become even more so. Black-white combat in Rhodesia will probably expand this year, as black "freedom fighters" are being trained by Cubans to oppose white rule in Namibia (formerly South-West Africa).

While no effective opposition to white control of South Africa seems likely this year, or perhaps even in this century, the trend makes black Africans more confident that someday, somehow, they will end apartheid rule there.

"The situation in southern Africa today presents the prospect of both progress and disaster," says William Schaefele, assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

Principle vs. Expediency

The developments give the U.S. a classic diplomatic dilemma of choosing between principle and expediency. Washington believes the blacks are morally right and has said so for years. Yet it is reluctant to offer support that might encourage warfare in southern Africa, causing casualties and economic disruption there. U.S. officials, seeing a no-win situation, resort to much mouthing of platitudes and wringing of hands.

"America has disappointed many in Africa by its failure to make equity and social justice more important than the raw materials" it gets from white-dominated areas, an African ambassador complains.

The African problem for the U.S. is compounded by the new Soviet and Cuban role. In Angola, Moscow's guns fired by Havana's soldiers brought a leftist government to power despite Western backing for two rival groups. The Cuban intervention may be repeated if local guerrillas prove ineffective against white rulers of Rhodesia and Namibia — though Cuban involvement doesn't seem imminent.

Already, for many Americans, the Communist presence has transformed African racial wars into part of a Soviet-American confrontation. Africa's white racists hope (and some U.S. officials fear) that Washington will feel impelled to give white regimes at least indirect aid in an effort to curtail

Russian and Cuban Influence.

If Havana's combat units (as distinct from advisers) enter new guerrilla wars, U.S. policymakers are considering direct retaliation against Cuba itself—rather than appear to be on the wrong side within Africa.

"The United States will not accept further Cuban military interventions abroad," Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in a Dallas speech last Monday night, without indicating what countermeasures might be taken. By some accounts, possible U.S. moves under study could include a blockade of Cuba, or even military attacks against it. But it's doubtful that such ideas would be adopted; congressional opposition would be strong.

Position on Portugal

The whole prospect is a sorry one in the view of many American specialists on Africa, and they feel it stems largely from long U.S. neglect of that huge continent. These critics recall that the U.S. decided consciously to support Portugal's dictatorial regime in Lisbon and overlook racial problems in its African territories, including Angola. The purpose was to contain communism by propping up a weak NATO ally, but the opposite happened: Some of the African territories now are ruled by Marxists, and Portugal itself nearly went Communist last year. The critics feel the U.S. let other African issues slide as well.

"The Russians were given the chance to be heroes in Africa due to U.S. neglect," says a black African diplomat.

Many outsiders say the African Bureau of the State Department has been weak for years. During Henry Kissinger's tenure, the press of Indochinese wars, problems with the Soviet Union, the Middle East and other grave matters have put Africa about last on the U.S. priority list. According to one academic specialist who has been consulted by the State Department, Mr. Kissinger once said, "This isn't Africa's century." But, adds the specialist, "It is rapidly becoming so, whether we like it or not."

To many Africans, Washington's policy toward their continent is somewhere between equivocal and evil. Unless revised, they suggest, the policy promises to erode further the 47 African nations' already-weak support for U.S. positions in the United Nations, north-south economic talks and other international gatherings.

"The U.S. ignored the racial issues for years," a senior U.S. official concedes. "Now it is all coming back to haunt us."

No Easy Answers

Thus, although there is some new bureaucratic wheel spinning in the State Department and elsewhere, easy answers aren't apparent. American leverage in southern Africa is limited. The U.S. hasn't any substantial presence there, so at least crucial American interests aren't at stake (though southern Africa does export such important commodities as chrome, cobalt, manganese, copper and oil).

Washington feels it lacks the ability to order white rulers to change their racist ways. It also feels it can't prevent blacks from using guerrilla warfare in their quest for power. The result is U.S. ambivalence that incurs the wrath of all sides.

The Angolan affair aggravated this low esteem for American policies. The U.S. intervened in an African civil war to try to defeat a Marxist faction that imported Communist troops. The intervention angered African leftists. Moreover, the American effort failed—dismaying black African moderates and white racists alike. They see the U.S. as ineffective and unable to prevent the future use of outside forces as racial hostilities spread.

Yet some possible American actions could put a better face on this government's African policies. The current reconsidera-

tion could bring such announcements next month, when Secretary Kissinger makes his first trip to Africa. Some African diplomats and American critics of the status quo hope Mr. Kissinger will use his journey as a face-saving opportunity to redirect or reemphasize some U.S. policies.

The immediate issue concerns Rhodesia (Zimbabwe to many black African nationalists). Technically, that country remains a British colony that unilaterally and illegally declared itself independent in 1965. Half again the size of Texas, it has fewer than 280,000 whites and more than six million blacks—but all significant political power and wealth are in white hands.

For years, the white government, now headed by Prime Minister Ian Smith, has rejected even gradual transition to black rule. The most recent negotiations between the Smith government and black leaders failed last week. The whites refused to make swift concessions, while the moderate blacks they talked to apparently no longer represent political activists who are being trained in neighboring Mozambique by Cuban military advisers.

In fact, border warfare has already begun, and the skirmishing is expected to grow now that the talks have collapsed. Some Africans claim 15,000 black Rhodesians now are skilled guerrilla fighters. Others say that number is much too high, but there is little doubt that blacks' military abilities and political determination are increasing.

Britain yesterday offered assistance if the Smith government promises majority rule there within 24 months. "Mr. Smith is leading his country on the path of death and destruction," British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan warned, and he said Rhodesia must quickly choose an "alternative." But many outsiders expect the white government will refuse to do so—making larger war inevitable.

For the record, the U.S. opposes minority rule in Rhodesia and elsewhere in Africa. President Ford said recently that "majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia is the unequivocal commitment of the United States." But this doesn't satisfy many Africans, who want to know what the U.S. will do about white minority governments.

Thus, for starters, the critics want a clear-cut U.S. statement of support for black Rhodesians and a promise that Washington won't support the whites there even if Cubans enter the fray directly. For geopolitical reasons, Mr. Kissinger finds such a pledge difficult, though he did say recently that the U.S. "will do nothing to help the white minority to exercise authority in Rhodesia." That statement came after the Smith government hailed U.S. pledges to thwart Cubans and Russians as indications of American help if the war expands.

Next, the critics want stronger administration efforts to repeal the so-called Byrd amendment—something that is under official consideration. The measure, sponsored by Sen. Harry Byrd (D., Va.), lets the U.S. import chrome from Rhodesia despite American pledges to honor a United Nations boycott against Rhodesia's white government. The administration annually makes a pro forma request for repeal of the amendment, which Congress then ignores. Now, critics say, it is time for the White House to push hard for repeal of the measure to demonstrate to Africans that Washington wants an end to illegal white rule in Rhodesia.

"Failure to repeal the Byrd amendment is a classic contradiction in America's African policy," a black African diplomat complains.

Next is the question of extra aid for African governments that suffer economically

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Monday, March 22, 1976

Curbing Soviet influence tough

Few diplomatic levers for the U.S. in Africa

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Is the United States a paper tiger in Africa?

In trying to find a way to curb the Soviet-Cuban adventures on the continent, U.S. foreign policy experts discern little to comfort them in their search to regain the diplomatic initiative.

The postponement last week of three cabinet-level U.S.-Soviet meetings dealing with housing, energy, and commerce, because it would not do to be seen socializing with the Soviets now, was a mere pinprick. Some critics are saying that, like President Ford's dropping of the word "detente," it had more to do with electoral than international politics.

Last fall Secretary Kissinger told the Soviet Union that if it persisted in its African adventure it would — regardless of Soviet claims that "wars of liberation" are outside the scope of detente — seriously affect U.S.-Soviet relations.

In the most sensitive area of U.S.-Soviet relations, the SALT talks are related negotiations on nuclear and conventional arms, the administration is anxious not to rock the boat. It wants SALT II. A related agreement on limiting atomic explosions for peaceful purposes now seems possible. This is, therefore, not an area in which pressure regarding Africa can be applied.

The two things the Soviet Union wants most from the United States are food and high technology. Theoretically the U.S. could withhold either. In fact, however, the new agreement under which the Soviet Union will buy 6 million tons of U.S. grain per year, worth roughly \$1 billion, very much suits the interests of the U.S. farmers, who would not like to lose it — especially in an election year. Furthermore, the Soviets could probably turn to other sources of supply.

Much the same can be said about high technology. Of \$1.8 billion worth of U.S. exports to the Soviet Union last year, about \$700 million consisted of machinery and equipment. But

Moscow buys even more from Western Europe and could get by without the U.S.

Theoretically, the United States might ask Concom, the committee composed of NATO representatives, minus Iceland and plus Japan, which still sits in Paris to regulate sensitive areas of East-West trade, to tighten up its restrictions. But the committee over a period of 20 years has reduced its list of prohibited export items from 400 to 150 and U.S. businessmen and U.S. allies would not welcome a reverse.

And so, the experts find that, short of unthinkable military sanctions or interference with arms-control talks, the U.S. in fact, has few levers. In that connection, they deplore the ill fate that overtook the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement which was rejected by the Soviet Union as a result of the attempt to include a provision requiring freer emigration of Soviet Jews.

Had the trade agreement gone into effect, U.S.-Soviet trade, benefiting from "most favored nation" treatment at customs and Export-Import Bank credits, would now be expanding. Within that framework, the experts observe, the U.S. would have had room to apply some pressures.

Since there appear to be no concrete steps the United States can take short of military intervention to dissuade the Soviets from their intrigues, some African experts believe Dr. Kissinger's last resort will be to try to persuade the African governments, by a mixture of diplomacy and economic aid blandishments, to resist Soviet and Cuban inroads.

Here the U.S. has strong allies in moderate presidents like Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Kenya who are worried by the Soviet/Cuban adventure.

The U.S., it is thought, can present itself as a friend of black Africa capable without violence to persuade Rhodesia to grant majority rule and South Africa, as a starter, to get its troops out of Angola.

This appears to be the route Dr. Kissinger plans to test on a trip to Africa, probably including South Africa, but excluding Rhodesia, next month.

because of the conflict over Rhodesia. Several states in southern Africa depend upon roads and railroads that cross Rhodesia, most of which now are closed. Most vulnerable is landlocked Zambia, which no longer can send its copper across Rhodesia to seaports or easily bring in imports. There is talk at the State Department of seeking an extra \$20 million or so for Zambia, with perhaps a U.S. airlift as well. Many officials feel the clear moral issues and low dollar costs involved would win congressional approval for such a request. There also may be an extra aid request for Mozambique, which has lost railroad revenues because it has closed its border with Rhodesia.

But U.S. policies remain inhibited by fears of an expanding war. If Cubans enter the Rhodesian fray, then the U.S. has pledged to take undefined counteraction. This most likely wouldn't be in Africa itself. Yet if South Africa sends troops to combat Rhodesian blacks (or Cuban allies), the dilemma will sharpen. The U.S. wants to avoid support of Rhodesia's white government — while also stemming outside Communist influence in Africa.

"There just aren't any easy solutions," a U.S. official laments.

Possible Complication

The Namibia issue is less pressing, but can't be ignored. South Africa, which has de facto control of the territory, now is promising autonomy to blacks there but is excluding the region's most militant and important political group, called, SWAPO. The U.S. and the UN oppose this plan as a violation of the UN-asserted authority over the former South-West Africa. They argue that South Africa is trying to create a puppet regime as a political buffer between black and white Africa, while protecting South Africa's investments in Namibia.

So Washington feels increasing pressure to oppose the South African move by diplomatic and economic means. The issue would grow more complicated if Cubans in Angola enter a conflict in Namibia, as Premier Fidel Castro has hinted may happen.

As for South Africa itself, any showdown is believed to be years away. An effective police force there prevents black political opposition from forming, and there is little chance of guerrilla activity anytime soon. More likely, in black African eyes, is a spontaneous uprising some day, one that might be totally uncontrolled and extremely violent. So the U.S. is being asked to use its economic leverage on South Africa to get apartheid policies moderated. For example, many Africans want U.S. companies to close their operations there rather than expand them. That, of course, would throw many blacks out of work and thus isn't a simple matter.

For now, the U.S. merely restates its opposition to the continued monopoly of political power in South Africa by its four million whites. Officially, the U.S. favors majority rule, which would give South Africa's 16 million blacks political control. But there is increasing belief among some Africa specialists that America's policies toward that nation must take more tangible form as black-white conflicts grow in southern Africa.